

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1346527-0

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SAC, Anchorage

1/19/51

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PROPOSED PLAN FOR
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

For your confidential info, there are transmitted
herewith two photostatic copies of a

65-59264 - 44

RECORDED - 81

Enclosures

WTB: eas

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-94 BY SP 128 TS/SC

EX-52

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

50 FEB 5 1951

COMM - FBI

JAN 20 1951
MAILED 19

RECEIVED
JAN 19 3 48 PM '51
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

rec'd (u)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont ☒ _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

12-16-50


NR 162200

8:20 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELL. GOV. RECON. IN ALASKA



RECEIVED:

12-16-50

8:44 PM

MW

Referral/Consult



~~6-21-94~~
~~SP3-BTS/SM~~
~~34225~~

SP3-BTS/SM
6-14-2000
00-1164

RECORDED - 101

65-59261-45

EX-113

5-WB

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

52 JAN 9 1951 (u)

65-59264

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE (12-22-50) NR 222100

7:36 P.M.

DIRECTOR URGENT

Referral/Consult

STAGE. ACCELERATED PRELIMINARY PROCESSING OF RECOMMENDED
POTENTIAL AGENTS GOING FORWARD.

[Redacted]

RECEIVED 12-22-50 8:05 P.M.

LL

[Large Redacted Area]

Referral/Consult

6-14-2000 SP3-BTJ/SM
00-1164

RECORDED - 94

65-59264-46
(DEC 20 1950) (u)

5-108

EX-116

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

DEC 21 1950 (u)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

to : The Director

FROM : D. M. Ladd

DATE: December 18/1950

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION;
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Re my memorandum to you dated December 8, 1950, which advised that information has been received from Alaska that

Reference

memorandum stated that

Supervisor Edward S. Sanders on December 12, 1950, met with the following individuals for a discussion of the programs in question: Colonel Perry, G-2, U.S. Army, Alaska; Lieutenant Colonel Easton, U.S.A.F., Assistant Director of Plans and Operations, Alaska Command; Lieutenant Colonel Bird, U.S.A.F. Director for Plans for Alaska Air Command; Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, U.S.A.F. Operations Headquarters, U.S.A.F.; Major Giblo, Directorate of Intelligence, Headquarters U.S.A.F., (Escape and Evasion); Major Joseph Cappucci, Headquarters OSI; Mr. Gilbert Levy, Counter-intelligence, OSI Headquarters.

Referral/Consult

A thorough discussion of the Escape and Evasion Program and the Stay-Behind Agent Program, which have been prepared by [redacted] FBI Headquarters and coordinated at Air Force Headquarters, revealed that while the basic plans have been agreed upon at Washington, they were not completely handled in Alaska inasmuch as Lieutenant Colonel Easton from the Alaska Air Command was not familiar with these plans. The Alaska Command is the over-all Command headed by an Air Force Officer and has under it in Alaska, an Air Command, an Army Command, and a Navy Command. Everyone agreed that the two basic plans prepared by [redacted] the Bureau are sound, and the only problem was the implementation of these plans.

Colonel Easton, Assistant Director of Plans and Operations for the Alaska Command, suggested, and the others agreed, that the Alaska Command instruct the Alaska Air

RECORDED - 23

INDEXED - 23

6 JAN 11 1951

ESS:pjb.

JAN 6 1955

FIVE

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Command to prepare plans for escape and evasion in Alaska and stay-behind Agents in Alaska. The plans which have been prepared by [] the Bureau could then immediately be put into effect and included in the over-all military plans for Alaska. Supervisor Sanders was advised that the order should reach the Alaska Air Command from the Alaska Command within a week and that these plans would then be in the proper channels and approved by everyone concerned. In other words, the Commanding General, Alaska Command, will instruct the Alaska Air Command to prepare the plans (which are already prepared) and supervise the implementation of these plans for him.

Referral/Consult

[]

There was some discussion concerning []

[]

[] This would appear to be of no concern to the Bureau inasmuch as it does not affect operations within Alaska. ~~S~~ - (U)


Referral/Consult

[]

REMAINS CLASSIFIED PER
OGA TELEPHONE CALL
SP9 CI 3/25/98

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~



Supervisor Sanders has been advised



RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

The foregoing is furnished for your information.
It is recommended that the attached air mail letter be forwarded to the SAC, Anchorage advising him of the results of instant conference.

*Rec'd
12-18-50
JAF*

*All I want is to get the
phone introduction & less
words.*

K.

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE

DATE: 1-8-51

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Personal and Confidential

Rebulet 1-2-51.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP1287818

ON 6-21-94

342251

With reference to paragraphs 6 and 7 of this letter, every effort is being made to obtain the type of potential stay-behind agent suggested by the Bureau for urban areas. However, it is pointed out that the only settlement in Alaska encompassed in this program which may be referred to as an urban area would be Anchorage. It has a white population of approximately twenty thousand people. The other areas to be covered have populations from less than 100 persons to only a few thousand. Every effort is being made and will continue to develop persons in the category of unskilled or semi-skilled workmen engaged in occupations which possibly would be of the least interest to an invading force.

With reference to the obtaining of full names and descriptions of potential stay-behind agents for inclusion in the first report submitted to aid the Bureau in searching their names, we are attempting in every instance to get sufficient data to aid the Bureau in this project. In some cases it has been difficult to obtain such information while still obtaining the discretion necessary to keep this project secret. However, upon authority of the Bureau to interview these individuals, full names, date and place of birth and description has been and will continue to be obtained.

With reference to the last paragraph of Bureau letter, all seven individuals on whom authority had been granted by the Bureau to interview have been interviewed or eliminated. Five of these individuals have consented to participate as stay-behind agents. The other two, ANTONIO POLET and SAM ROMACK, have been eliminated because of information received from confidential informants.

Reports have been submitted on all of these individuals except [redacted] Reports on these individuals are being prepared and will be submitted immediately.

RECORDED - 13

INDEXED - 13

15-5721-48

JAN 10 1951

15

Referral/Consult

JET:MR

COPIES DESTROYED

R 584 N07 21 1950

60 MAR 14 1951

b6
b7C

AM File 65-208

By way of recapitulation on the action taken by this office with reference to stage, approximately 65 reports on potential stay-behind agents have been submitted to the Bureau with recommendations that authority be granted to interview them. Five individuals have been interviewed upon the authority of the Bureau and all have agreed to participate. Authority was granted to interview two more, but these were not interviewed inasmuch as information came to our attention which eliminated them as potential agents. Preliminary reports on additional individuals are being compiled and will be submitted at the earliest possible moment.

These projects are receiving priority in this division and continued diligent attention will be given them.

SAC, Anchorage

1/8/51

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT
PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

710

RECORDED - 13 65-59264-49
Reur radiogram 12/29/50 informing that

For your confidential info.

WTB: eas

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-90 BY SP12 BT/SC

REC-
FBI
FACED-UNIT
JAN 6 2 08 PM

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

MAILED 10
JAN 8 1951
COMM - FBI

64489
52 JAN 13 1951

65-59264-

Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☒
 Clegg ☒
 Glavin ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tracy ☒
 Harbo ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Nease ☒
 Gandy ☒

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (e) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(12-29-50)

NR 292045

6:14 P.M.

DIRECTOR

Referral/Consult

URGENT

STAGE.

REPORTS REGARDING FORTY POTENTIAL AGENTS HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED TO BUREAU. OTHERS WILL BE SUBMITTED AS QUICKLY AS SAME CAN BE TYPED.

RECEIVED

(12-29-50)

6:19 P.M.

LL

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 13

(JAN 11 1951)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65-59264

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

760 FROM ANCHORAGE (1-6-51) (e) (u) NR 070115 10:17 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. REBULET (SECOND) INSTANT LAST PARAGRAPH. FRANK B. MOORE, [REDACTED] HOWARD G. ROMIG, AND JOE DANICH HAVE AGREED TO ACT AS STAY BEHIND AGENTS. ANTONIO POLET AND SAM RICHACK NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED BECAUSE OF STATEMENTS MADE RE THEM BY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT(S). REPORTS RE THESE SIX HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED. [REDACTED] HAS BEEN UNAVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW BUT SAME BEING HANDLED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. REPORT SUBMITTED ON FIFTY OTHERS IN WHICH BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FOR INTERVIEWS. OTHER REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED AS SOON AS SAME CAN BE TYPED. LETTER RE [REDACTED] AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWS.

RECEIVED

(1-6-51) (e) (u)

10:33 PM LH

Referral/Consult

6-21-94
 Classified by SP12 BTJ/ST
 Declassify on: OADR 342251

RECEIVED BY SR3-BTJ/ST

G-14-2000

00-1164

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-11-83 BY [REDACTED]

RECORDED - 101

INDEXED - 101

65-57264-50
 (JAN 11 1951) (e) (u)
 5-WB

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (e) (u)

407

SAC, Anchorage

January 11, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

34225
SP12 BTSLP

I desire again to call to your attention the absolute necessity of utilizing extreme caution, discretion and sound judgment in the handling of this Program.

It is imperative that you impress all Bureau personnel at Anchorage with the security measures which must be taken in developing instant Program.

A review of the reports recently submitted by Anchorage on individual potential Stay-behind Agents in some instances reflect statements to the effect that identified reliable and confidential informants "have recommended _____ as a potential Stay-behind Agent under this Program," or "_____ has been interviewed concerning instant Program."

Referral/Consult

It is recognized that the wording of the reports in this connection may merely reflect the Special Agent's general description of matters discussed with the individual potential Stay-behind Agent. It is further recognized that it has been necessary for you to personally discuss instant matter with reliable and well-established contacts of the Anchorage Office in order to identify and determine the reliability and background of various individuals being considered under this Program. Under no circumstances, however, should it become general knowledge in Alaska that the Bureau _____ are engaged in the development of this Program. Individual Stay-behind Agents should not know the identity of one another. When Special Agents are interviewing potential contacts in this regard, no indication should be given that an "espionage net" or "Stay-behind Agent Program" is being developed in Alaska.

RECORDED - 99

In all contacts with potential Stay-behind Agents, the matter of security should be stressed. When interviewing Special Agents. The individual should be cautioned not to discuss the subject matter with other persons. It might be pointed out that an indiscreet remark on the part of a potential Stay-behind Agent might very possibly, in the event of invasion, endanger his own life.

WTB:EHW

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

JAN 20 1951

Handwritten initials and signatures, including a large "C" and "J.F."

112

Referral/Consult

It is suggested that you may also desire to discuss the security features of this Program with [redacted] [redacted] with the thought in mind of discreetly bringing this matter to his attention so that the personnel under his jurisdiction may become aware of the importance of the security measures involved in instant matter.

Advise the Bureau what action you have taken in order to insure that captioned Program in Alaska will be handled on a confidential and secure basis.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 1-12-51

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

6/22/94
Classified by SP12 BT/S/SC
Declassify on: OADR 342251

Reference is made to Anchorage letter dated 1/8/51 and specifically to Page 3, Paragraph 3 thereof.

On 1/11/51 a conference was held in the Office of Operations, Alaska Command at Fort Richardson. Those present were:

Col. L. R. TORRANT
U. S. Army
Director of Plans and Operations
Alaska Command

Lt. Col. H. Brooks Wilson
U. S. Air Force
Asst. Director of Plans and Operations.
Alaska Command

Lt. Col. C. W. Bird
U. S. Air Force
Alaskan Air Command
Attached to Office of Director of Plans and Operations

Captain Minor Heine
U. S. Navy
Director of Intelligence
Alaska Command

Lt. Col. Edwin A. Hartley
Director
Office of Special Investigations in Alaska

John H. Williams
Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Anchorage, Alaska

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY SP7C
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
PR 96-2 PR 96-245 REMAIN
Classified PER OGA TEL 001.

COPIES DESTROYED
R584 NOV 21 1960

COPIES DESTROYED
R584 NOV 21 1960

EX-36
INDEXED - 20
16-5-51-52

9 MAY 1961
CS 298

Referral/Consult

5-WB

AN File 65-296
62-227

~~SECRET~~
Referral/Consult

The Bureau will be kept advised in this regard.

As was pointed out in Anchorage teletype of January 10, 1951, 101 persons have been considered by this office as potential stay-behind agents. To date 14 have been eliminated because of information received from confidential informants. Closing reports have been submitted on these 14 stating that they were no longer being considered. Five persons have been interviewed upon the authority of the Bureau and all have consented to participate. Preliminary reports have been submitted on the remaining 32 recommending that Bureau authority be granted to interview them.

SAC, Anchorage

January 15, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

no
It is noted in reports being submitted by the Anchorage Office on potential Stay-behind Agents, that Bureau permission is being requested to interview these individuals and that requests of this nature are being included on the administrative page of the individual report submitted. Due to the urgency of this program and in order to save stenographic and typing time, the Bureau has no objection to your continuing this practice instead of directing a cover letter to the Bureau setting out the specific request. In all other types of cases, of course, the Anchorage Office should be guided by Part I, Section 58 (d) of the FBI Handbook in setting out leads for the Bureau.

65-59264

WTB:dar:niff ry.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-94 BY SP2 BTB/80

JAN 16 11 02 AM '51
RECEIVED PLANNING ROOM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECORDED - 9

65-59264-58
JAN 19 1951
80
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

EX-123

REC'D - 102 DEPT. OF JUSTICE
JAN 19 1951
FBI

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

51 JAN 22 1951
COMM - FBI
MAILED 20

WB

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

1949 **1950**

STOP SPECIAL

For STOP DESK ✓

For NUMBERING _____

For RECORDING 22

ROUTE TO

Mr. W

Room: 4245

Mr. _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-94 BY SP12 B-TS/80

22

(DECODED COPY) (S) (U)

(1-11-51) (e) (u)

2:14 P.M.

G. I. R. -8

URGENT

STAGE. TO DATE 101 PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THIS OFFICE. TO DATE 14 HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED BECAUSE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. CLOSING REPORTS INDICATING THESE NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED. 5 PERSONS RECOMMENDED HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY AND ALL AGREED TO PARTICIPATE. CLOSING REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED ON THESE 5. PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED ON REMAINING 82 RECOMMENDING BUREAU AUTHORITY BE GIVEN TO INTERVIEW THEM.

RECEIVED

(1-11-51) ~~(6)~~ (u)

2:40 P.M.

GW

6-14-2000

SP3-BTJ/JM

00-1164

RECORDED - 40

65-59264-54
 (2011-10-18) (P) (L) (B)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. *E. J. [signature]*

59 JAN 26 1951

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

~~SECRET~~

DATE: January 22, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF AN INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BPS/SC

ON 6-21-94

342251

Reference is made to Anchorage letter dated January 12, 1951.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY SP2/BJS/HW
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
 Pre Dec letter dtd 7/2/99

RECORDED - 50

65-298

cc: 27-227

COPIES DESTROYED
 R 584 NOV 21 1950

~~SECRET~~

JAN 25 1951

Referral/Consult

25

S-Bain

MAR 15 1951

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Anchorage File 65-298

[REDACTED]

This office is continuing to give attention to the recruitment of potential stay-behind agents and interviews with those authorized by the Bureau and reports on the same will be forwarded at the earliest possible time.

Referral/Consult

As has been done in the past, this office will continue to hold conferences with [REDACTED] and keep him abreast of all developments in the SBA Program.

It is noted that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ever, in line with the instructions received from the Bureau in its letter dated Nov. 29, 1950, (Bu file 65-59264), Paragraph 1, Page 6, no reports have been given to him.

Referral/Consult

This matter will continue to receive diligent attention and the Bureau will be kept advised of all developments.

~~SECRET~~

*no discussion
of this
information
was given to
anyone
w/o*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 1-17-51

SUBJECT: ○ PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (Stay-Behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-21-94 BY SP12 BTB/JO

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~
 JAN 20 1951

Rebulet 1-11-51.

Concerning Paragraph 3 of that letter, the wording of certain reports in these cases indicating that a confidential informant has recommended a certain person as a potential stay-behind agent represents the Special Agent's general description of the discussion had with the confidential informant. At no time are the Special Agents working on these matters in conversations with confidential informants or with the potential agents themselves telling them the exact nature of the program. The confidential informants merely know that we are interested in certain individuals in the Territory with particular reference to their loyalty, character, intentions if war comes and ability to participate in certain patriotic activities. In no instant has a confidential informant been told the exact nature of this program.

In discussing this matter with a potential agent after authority has been granted by the Bureau, he is first impressed with the confidential nature of the interview. He is then asked what his intentions are if war comes in order that our subsequent suggestions will have no undue influence upon him. He is then given enough information to allow him to make up his mind as to his participation. The identity of no other potential stay-behind agent is discussed with him. At the end of the interview the absolute security of this matter is again impressed upon him.

Concerning the penultimate paragraph in referenced letter, the security features of this program have been discussed with [redacted] on numerous occasions. He has advised me [redacted]

However, continued attention will be given the security of the program through [redacted] and by the Special Agents of this office.

Referral/Consult

65-298
 JHW:MR

RECORDED - 48

65-59264- 56
 JAN 20 1951
 26

53 JAN 30 1950

46

5- [signature]

65-59264-

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: February 1, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF AN INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Rebulet January 30, 1951, wherein the Bureau directed that the names of additional prospective agents under consideration be submitted by letter.

In addition to the names which have already been submitted, the following have been proposed and [redacted] are being made concerning them. Preliminary reports concerning these prospective agents will be submitted at the earliest possible time.

b2
b7E

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 342251
 DATE 6-21-94 BY SP12878180

As the Bureau knows, in addition to those new prospective agents listed above, this office presently has a number concerning whom preliminary reports have been submitted, Bureau authority to interview has been received and they are presently assigned for interview. The results of these interviews and the recommendations of the Anchorage Office will be submitted to the Bureau at the earliest possible time.

JHW:MMA
 65-298

RECORDED - 104
 INDEXED - 104

165-57264-57
 FEB 6 1951
 8

5 FEB 9 1951

5-3-1-103

Placed
in 5134
Control file
W.S.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

(u) (e)
January 29, 1951

DEFERRED

Transmit the following message to: SAC, ANCHORAGE

(e) (u) CIPHER PAD CODE (e) (u)

STAGE. REURAD (JANUARY ELEVEN) LAST. ACTION TAKEN BY BUREAU ALL ANCHORAGE
REPORTS SUBMITTED ON INDIVIDUAL SBA-S RECEIVED TO DATE. ADVISE BY RADIO-
GRAM NUMBER AND IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED WHO HAVE AGREED TO ACT
AND ARE RECOMMENDED BY YOU. SUBMIT BY LETTER NAMES ADDITIONAL PROSPECTIVE
SBA-S UNDER CONSIDERATION. TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS MENTIONED
RECENT ANCHORAGE COMMUNICATIONS BEING DISCUSSED [REDACTED] AND YOU WILL BE
NOTIFIED RESULTS PROMPTLY. EFFECTIVE (FEBRUARY ONE) NEXT AND EVERY THURSDAY
THEREAFTER SURAD SUMMARY PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENTS INSTANT PROGRAM.

HOOVER

Referral/Consult

WFB:VJM

65-59264

Classified by SP3 BTJ/m
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/m
ON 6-14-2000

00-1164

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

RECORDED - 20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED READING ROOM
JAN 29 3 20 PM '51

JAN 31 1951

FEB 12 1951

SENT VIA Bureau Radio (129.5) 7 P M

Per [Signature]

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(1-31-51)

DECODED COPY (e)(u)

NR 311810

4:23 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. REBURAD (JANUARY 30, 1951) FOLLOWING PERSONS HAVE
AGREED TO ACT AS STAYBEHIND AGENTS, HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED AND
CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. JOE DANICH, GIRDWOOD, ALASKA, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
FRANK BERTON MOORE, ANCHORAGE, [REDACTED]
HOWARD GLENMORE ROMIG, ANCHORAGE, [REDACTED]
DOCTOR JOSEPH HARRISON SHELTON, [REDACTED]

(Corrected) SEWARD, [REDACTED] FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS
HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED, AGREED TO ACT AS AGENTS AND RECOMMENDED
AND CLOSING REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED (JANUARY 31) [REDACTED]

ADDITIONAL PROSPECTIVE AGENTS BEING SUBMITTED. LETTER SETTING OUT NAMES OF
INTERVIEWS BEING MADE DAILY AND CLOSING REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED
AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

RECEIVED

(1-31-51)

4:48 PM LH

RECORDED - 20

INDEXED - 20

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (e)(u)

b6
b7c

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 7, 1951


FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Reference is made to Anchorage letters dated 12/5/50 and 1/12/51 and particularly to Page 4 of the latter reference.

Referral/Consult



In attempting to develop stay-behind agents, emphasis will be placed on getting them in the vicinities of strategic areas.

It is noted in investigating and interviewing the potential agents that many of them live in the back country where they are not accessible by any means other than a bush plane on skis in the wintertime and bush plane on pontoons in the summertime or afoot. This has materially slowed down the overall program. However, every effort is being made to contact those individuals concerning whom the Bureau has authorized an interview.

When this program has developed sufficiently to institute the training phase as much time as possible should be given this office to contact the various persons to attend particular classes inasmuch as many of them will have to be sought out individually, and the same will consume a considerable amount of time.

65-298
JHW:vf

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/SC
ON 6-21-94 342251

RECORDED - 48

165-59264-60
FEB 10 1951
13

5-13-113

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *PH*
 FROM : Mr. Bowles *Sub*
 SUBJECT: The Steky II
 miniature camera
 Photographic Research
Sto / e

DATE: January 25, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-21-94 BY SP12BTS/SC

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
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Reference is made to my memorandum dated December 8, 1950, setting forth details concerning the Steky II camera and suggesting certain uses for this camera. An addendum was added to this memorandum on December 13, 1950, by Mr. C. E. Hennrich of the Security Investigative Division in which it was suggested that consideration be given to the use of this camera in the Bureau's Alaska Stay-Behind the Agents Program. It was also suggested that the Bureau purchase two of these cameras and that the Laboratory conduct sufficient tests in order to express an opinion as to the use of this camera in subzero temperatures such as might be encountered in Alaska.

Two of the above cameras, including two telephoto lens, have been received. The camera has been tested at subzero temperatures and has been found to operate satisfactorily at temperatures ranging down to 20 degrees below zero. On the basis of these tests, it is not believed that any difficulty should be encountered in the use of the Steky II camera at low temperatures.

The two cameras referred to above have been turned over to the Photographic Laboratory where they are available for assignment.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the results of the Laboratory tests made with the Steky II camera be furnished the Security Investigative Division for their information.

MDP
 MDP:mdp

80-687

RECORDED - 48

165-59264-61

FEB 18 1951
34*Jan 25*

SEVEN-
 FIVE-
 THREE-
Jan 25

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 80-687-17

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont
 FROM : C. E. Hennrich

DATE: February 6, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
 IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
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 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
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 Harbo _____
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 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-21-94 BY SP-12 BTJ/SJC

PURPOSE

Referral/Consult

To recommend that [redacted]
 be informed of the results of tests made by the FBI Laboratory
 concerning the miniature camera, The Steky II, which camera
 is available commercially.

BACKGROUND

Referral/Consult

As you are aware, the training program for Stay-behind
 Agents is presently being prepared at the Bureau [redacted]

Referral/Consult

There are attached self-explanatory memoranda dated
 December 8, 1950 and January 25, 1951 from Mr. Bowles to Mr.
 Harbo reflecting results of tests made by the laboratory con-
 cerning the use of the miniature camera, The Steky II, especi-
 ally as relates to the use of this camera at low temperatures.

It is noted that The Steky II is available on the
 commercial market.

RECOMMENDATION

RECORDED - 48

165-59264-62

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that [redacted]

13 1951

tests made at the FBI Laboratory reflect that instant camera
 can be operated at temperatures ranging down to twenty degrees
 below zero.

65-59264

Handled Sep
 Attachments
 WTB:LJB:mhf

Referral/Consult

UNR ORDERED COPY FILED IN

W3

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: February 13, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (65-59264) *Ostay -*

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP12 BTG/SC*
 ON *6-21-94*
342251

There is set out hereinafter a recapitulation of the Stay Behind Agent Program in this office, including information of an administrative nature, as well as data concerning agents who have been recommended and on whom closing reports have been submitted to the Bureau, together with certain problems encountered and the approach that is being made to this assignment.

There is transmitted herewith

I. STAY BEHIND AGENTS

Referral/Consult

In considering individuals in the territory as potential Stay Behind Agents, accent has been placed on enlisting those who have as many of the following qualifications as could be found.

- 1 - Persons with good health, loyal to the United States and who intend to stay in the territory in case of war or invasion.
- 2 - Persons with an intimate knowledge of the territory or the locale in which they reside.
- 3 - Persons with a knowledge of short wave radios.
- 4 - Persons who own short wave radios and have "ham" licenses.
- 5 - Persons who are airplane pilots.
- 6 - Persons who own airplanes.
- 7 - Persons with the ability to survive in the back country of the territory of Alaska under the most severe conditions for protracted periods of time.

RECORDED - 48

INDEXED - 48

65-59264-63

FEB 16 1951

JHW:MMA

65-298

Enclosure

50 APR 9 1951

5-6-11-11

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

- 8 - Persons who have had some experience in caching food, clothing, arms and ammunition, gasoline and other survival gear.
- 9 - Persons who have had experience mushing dog teams.
- 10 - Persons who have had experience with small boats and who know the waters of Cook Inlet, Prince William Sound and the coast of Alaska between Shelikof Strait and Prince Rupert.
- 11 - Persons who own or have access to cabins located in areas which necessarily will be utilized in this program.
- 12 - Persons who live in and around the strategic areas listed.
- 13 - Persons who live on and can observe the highways of Alaska.
- 14 - Persons who live on and can observe the railroad.
- 15 - Persons who can assist in the operation and maintenance of a "life and supply line".

II. NUMBER OF STAY BEHIND AGENTS

As has been noted heretofore in correspondence with the Bureau, it is impossible to set a number of Stay Behind Agents who would be adequate in giving ample and comprehensive intelligence coverage during an invasion or occupation. However, the project of obtaining Stay Behind Agents will be continued until the Bureau is satisfied that the strategic areas and all items referred to in I above appear to be sufficiently covered.

There is being set out hereinafter the names and locations of persons who have been investigated, interviewed and recommended as Stay Behind Agents for the Bureau's ready reference:

LAWSON FORBES BAKER, Fairbanks - 62-93600

[REDACTED] - 62-93639

[REDACTED] 62-93602

[REDACTED] - 62-93482

[REDACTED] 62-93646

[REDACTED] - 62-93636

JOE DANICH, Girdwood

[REDACTED] - 62-93483

b6
b7C

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

[redacted] - 62-93484
[redacted] 62-93524
[redacted] - 62-93498
[redacted] - 62-93634
[redacted] - 62-93597
[redacted] 77-31169
[redacted] - 62-93628
[redacted] 62-93526
[redacted]
[redacted] - 62-93626
[redacted] 62-93624
[redacted] - 62-93496
[redacted] 62-93495
[redacted] - 62-93647
[redacted] - 62-93621
[redacted] - 62-93565
DR. HOWARD GLENMORE ROMIG, Anchorage
[redacted] - 62-93489
[redacted] 62-93518
DR. JOSEPH HARRISON SHELTON, Seward - 62-93494
FOSTER RAYMOND SIMS, Palmer - 62-93603
[redacted] - 62-93617
[redacted] - 62-93670
[redacted] - 62-93520
[redacted] - 62-93568
[redacted] 62-93643
[redacted] 77-44306
[redacted] - 62-93644

b6
b7C

32
41
All other cases on which preliminary reports have been submitted and Bureau authority requested to conduct an interview, numbering 36 at this writing, have been assigned and Agents are presently on road trips attempting to locate and interview them.

Preliminary reports on 30 additional potential Stay Behind Agents have been submitted to the Bureau with a request for authority to interview them.

Cases on 31 individuals have been closed and the individuals themselves not recommended in view of information contained in the Bureau files, information received here from confidential informants or information contained in the Anchorage files.

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

As is noted above, continued efforts will be made to obtain additional potential Agents but in the interests of completing as many as possible in the least possible time with the limited personnel at hand, this is being deferred until those concerning whom we have had authority to interview have been contacted and closing reports submitted.

It is noted that we have been able to make several interviews in such towns in strategic areas as Seward, Fairbanks, Anchorage and Palmer. However, we are now finding that persons to be interviewed reside in isolated sections and must be sought out one by one. This is consuming a considerable amount of time. In a number of instances, such persons do not live in areas covered by the established airlines and it is necessary to contact bush pilots on a charter basis so that the Agents can be flown in, waited for and flown out. In some cases it will be necessary to wait until trappers, hunters or other persons in isolated sections come into Anchorage or Fairbanks, where we have resident agencies, to be interviewed. Such persons have no contact whatsoever with the outside world and Agent personnel would not be utilized efficiently if it were detailed to spend a protracted period of time hunting them up one at a time.

It is noted also that this office has been hampered in its efforts to make contacts and interviews in the country surrounding Glenn Allen, Tok Junction and Big Delta by the severe cold. In this area in the past several weeks the temperature has been between 50 and 60 degrees below zero, making travel extremely hazardous.

III. TRAINING

Referral/Consult

Comments concerning training in this program have been made in Bureau letter of November 29, 1950, Anchorage letter of December 5, 1950, and Anchorage letter of January 8, 1951. In the last letter mentioned it is noted that

Also with reference to training of the agents when this program reaches that stage, it is contemplated that all agents be fingerprinted and photographed in order that this identifying data will be available to the Bureau and to the administration of this program.

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

Referral/Consult

IV. COMMUNICATIONS

Proposed method of handling radio communications was set out in Anchorage letter of December 18, 1950, and comments concerning a review of it by the radio experts in the FBI Laboratory were returned by Bureau letter of January 31, 1951. [REDACTED]

It is noted that almost all radio installations in the territory of Alaska will be in isolated and rugged terrain and it is suggested that possibly more than one man should be detailed to operate each radio. This suggestion is augmented by the fact that in almost every case the radio will need a power unit inasmuch as electricity will not be available. It is felt that more than one man will be needed to make such a radio installation mobile or, if it is stationary, to man it for protracted periods of time. Likewise, it is felt that two men would have a better opportunity for survival, both against an enemy and against the rigors of this climate if they were able to work together.

Referral/Consult

In addition to radio communication, it is possible that a ground to air radio contact may be set up. However, in view of the fact that [REDACTED]

Communication by courier has been considered but it is pointed out that such relays will be slow to the point of being almost useless. In addition to this, in the winter courier by snowshoes and dog teams will be impossible in many sections.

Referral/Consult

It is noted that considerable time and effort will be necessary to transport radios, power units and necessary accessories to each point of location. The summer is the only season which lends itself to this function. In view of this, it is suggested that the Bureau may desire to point out to the [REDACTED] that almost a whole year will be lost if something is not done in this respect during the summer of 1951.

Likewise, it is noted that summer is the best and only practicable time to carry in materials, build caches and draft maps of the same. If this project is not started in 1951, it will almost necessarily have to be put off until 1952.

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

V. CACHING

Inasmuch as considerable caching of supplies, arms, ammunition, gasoline, radios and other Arctic survival gear will have to be done, this office is in the process of compiling a dossier on this activity. It is noted that though contact has been made with the Army and Air Force here in the territory, no written material on it has been found. Hence, we are compiling our information from various sources such as Fish and Wildlife Service; Arctic Survival Unit of the Army, particularly the Big Delta, Alaska, section; hunters, trappers and other individuals who have spent much time in the back country. This dossier will contemplate the following:

A - Essential items to be cached

- 1 - Radio parts and equipment
- 2 - Arms and ammunition and other weapons
- 3 - Clothing
- 4 - Medicines
- 5 - Foods
- 6 - Gear and supplies necessary for agents' cover such as traps, prospectors tools
- 7 - Photographic equipment
- 8 - Gear necessary for operation of agents such as field glasses, cameras where necessary, flashlight, signal panel, signal mirror and signal flags
- 9 - Snowshoes and skis where necessary
- 10 - Gasoline when and where necessary
- 11 - Explosives
- 12 - Camp gear

B - Places for caching

- 1 - In lakes, streams and rivers
- 2 - In caves
- 3 - In ground
- 4 - Stilted caches
- 5 - In trees
- 6 - In cabins

C - Manner of sealing or making weather tight the cached materials

- 1 - In sealed cans
- 2 - In water and moisture proof foil

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

- 3 - In boxes where cache is not exposed to the elements
- 4 - Canvas or burlap where suitable and cache is not exposed to the elements

D - Mapping and marking caches

- 1 - Marking same on detailed maps
- 2 - Marking same by directions based on natural terrain barriers and bounds
- 3 - By personal knowledge of person making cache

E - Amount of caching materials

- 1 - Amounts necessary to sustain life of one person for an arbitrary term of 2 years

F - Choosing cache locations

- 1 - General knowledge of the Stay Behind Agent
- 2 - Aid of an expert examining the locale in which a cache is desired

G - Methods of transporting supplies to cache location

- 1 - Flying them in
- 2 - By railroad in certain instances
- 3 - By water
- 4 - By packing them in

H - The building of caches

Referral/Consult

- 1 - By the Stay Behind Agent himself
- 2 - By experts in this field

It is realized that quite possibly the

However, this phase is being considered by this office inasmuch as it appears that time is of the essence and if the program in this respect is not accelerated and something done on it during the summer of 1951, it will have to be deferred until the summer of 1952 because of weather, terrain and other evident obstacles natural to this territory.

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

VI. LIFE AND SUPPLY LINE

As has been noted in the reports received by the Bureau in connection with interviews of those individuals who have been recommended as Stay Behind Agents, it is set out whether such individual is able to operate or owns an airplane. In this regard consideration has been given to the establishment of a lifeline for the Stay Behind Agents. It will be necessary, of course, to supply them from time to time with arms, ammunition, food, clothing and other gear necessary to the success of this endeavor and essential to the existence of the agents.

This office is making a study of the most logical mountain passes, air routes and logical spots for landing by pontoons, skis and wheels. These routes, of course, will necessarily emanate from positions in the territory of Alaska and possibly later in Canada which will be out of the zone of occupation.

While an effort has been made to obtain any type of written material on such a project, none has been found. Hence, our sources thus far have been the Fish and Wildlife Service, which habitually flies over all of this country in bush type aircraft. We are also contacting the CAA here which has detailed maps of all of the country in which we are interested. In addition, we are also obtaining information from bush pilots, big game guides who own planes and prospectors who own planes in order that we may ultimately have a complete dossier on this field.

Referral/Consult

In this regard, it is probably contemplated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it is felt that such a study should be made even though it is discarded at a later date.

In connection with this project or if the Air Force provides the plane service, necessary gasoline caches will have to be made at various places in the territory inasmuch as the type of plane (bush aircraft) will not be able to fly sorties to all Stay Behind Agent locations and return to its base without refueling.

Also with reference to this life and supply line, it is pointed out that gasoline caches will have to be made during the summer months in a great part of the territory. If something is not done on this phase of the program during the summer of 1951, it necessarily will have to be deferred until the following summer.

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

Referral/Consult



This matter will continue to receive priority attention and the Bureau will be advised of all developments.

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Nease ✓
Gandy ✓

(DECODED COPY) (u) ✓

FROM ANCHORAGE

(2-8-51) (u) NR 081800

3:08 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. SUMMARY OF PROGRAM. TO DATE 134 PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS IN THIS PROGRAM. OF THIS NUMBER 30 HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY, CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED AND THESE PERSONS RECOMMENDED FOR INCLUSION IN PROGRAM. AUTHORITY HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM BUREAU TO INTERVIEW 42 OTHERS. THESE INTERVIEWS ASSIGNED, BEING MADE AT EARLIEST TIME, CLOSING REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE MADE. OF TOTAL NUMBER CONSIDERED 24 ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO BUREAU WITH RECOMMENDATIONS THAT BUREAU AUTHORITY BE GRANTED FOR INTERVIEWS. EIGHT MORE PRELIMINARY REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED WITH REQUEST TO INTERVIEW. OF TOTAL NUMBER, CASES ON THIRTY HAVE BEEN CLOSED BECAUSE OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES OR INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS THESE THIRTY NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED.

RECEIVED: (2-8-51) (u) 3:21 PM

Referral/Consult

COPIES DESTROYED

SEP 1951

6-14-2000

SP3-B15/37

00-1164

RECORDED - 48

GLA

6-21-94
SP12-878150
342251

65-59264-64, V13
(FEB 1 1951) (u)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

59 FEB 19 1951 (u)

cc: Mr. Tolson

"The Journal" (Editorial), Ottawa, Ontario
January 18, 1951

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Boardman _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Miss Gandy _____

Alaska and the Russians.

Amid all our concern about Korea and Western Europe there has been less talk about the possibility of invasion of this continent. The Sweetbriar and Musk-ox operations engaged in by the Canadian Army proved, above all, that war in the Arctic and sub-Arctic will be incredibly difficult and wasteful in men and resources. The Russians being as well aware of these conditions as the Canadians and Americans, the feeling seems to have grown that the battle of Democracy vs. Communism, if it has to be fought, will be decided elsewhere.

The trouble with the Russians is that their way of thought does not always follow what appears a logical pattern to Western eyes. In recent months, too, we have learned from the Chinese Communists that threats and warnings may be followed by action, as witness the surge of Red soldiers from Manchuria after declarations of their leaders this was about to happen unless the United Nations' forces withdrew.

These facts in mind, it is to be hoped that military authorities in Washington and Ottawa have paid attention to an article in the Russian *Literary Gazette*—Russian declarations appear in the strangest places—which claims the Americans have turned Alaska into a "land aircraft carrier" and a military springboard for aggression against the Soviet Union and the countries of the Pacific. In brief, the Russian publication considers American Alaska a menace, and in unkindly thoughts towards that territory it need not be expected that North-western Canada is excluded.

And just to prove that its readers will believe anything about Alaska, the *Literary Gazette* goes on to declare that since the purchase of Alaska by the United States in 1867 the high standards of culture, industry and technique established there by the Russians have disintegrated under the "notorious Western civilization" brought to the region by "Yankee militarists".

This forces us to recall ALEXANDER BARANOF, the Russian dictator of old, Alaska, seated in state in his great wooden castle, cannon frowning down on the Thlinket Indians who knew too well the power of his guns and the weight of his knout, old BARANOF who received with rum or oaths, as the spirit moved him, the Canadian and American fur traders who came to his territory, some of them having eaten their snowshoe thongs and moccasins en route. If BARANOF represented culture, industry and fine technique we are prepared, here and now, to declare we are sodden clods and Russia should have Alaska and all the Barrens.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-94 BY

SP12875/SC
342251

65-59264-65

5-WB

SAC, Anchorage

February 3, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

As of possible interest in connection with the planning and development of instant program in Alaska, there are enclosed two photostatic copies of a self-explanatory article which appeared in the January 18, 1951 issue of "The Journal," Ottawa, Canada, which article was made available by the Bureau's liaison representative in Ottawa.

The above is furnished for your information.

65-59264

Enclosures

WTB:LJB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-94 BY SP12875/SC

ENC.

FEB 3 2 13 PM '51

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FEB 8 1951

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Nease _____
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FEB 20 1951

COMM - FBI
FEB - 3 1951
MAILED 20

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 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

UP
 (DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (1-31-51) (u) NR 312046

5:21 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

RE STAGE. REBULET (JANUARY 12) ON [REDACTED] (u) AND BULET (JANUARY 16) ON [REDACTED] (u) AND BULETS (JANUARY 22) ON [REDACTED] (u) AND BULETS (JANUARY 26) ON [REDACTED] (u) IN THESE LETTERS BUREAU STATES IN EVENT [REDACTED] CONDUCTED BY ANCHORAGE REFLECT NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CONTACT AND INTERVIEW. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED POLICY PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES WERE MADE IN LINE WITH DISCRETION AND SECURITY OF THIS PROJECT AND REPORT SUBMITTED. BUREAU ADVICE REQUESTED WHETHER INDIVIDUALS MAY BE INTERVIEWED WITHOUT FURTHER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INASMUCH AS SAME ALREADY MADE. (SUREP.)?

RECEIVED

(1-31-51) (u)

5:25 PM LH

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 10/1/00 BY 1045~~

6.21/94
 6012 BTJ/SC
 342251

EX-100-100000 BY SP3-BTJ/M
 6-24-2000

00-1164 RECORDED - 68

INDEXED 68

45-59264-66
 5-UB
 (FEB 8 1951) (u)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FEBRUARY 1951

(u)
RADIOGRAM
DEFERRED
CIPHER PAD CODE (u)

RECORDED - 68

65-59264-66

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. REURRAD (JANUARY THIRTY ONE) LAST. REVIEW ANCHORAGE
REPORTS SUBMITTED SEVEN INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED URRAD REFLECTS
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INCOMPLETE AND CONSISTED OF
CONTACTING VARIOUS INFORMANTS. IN EVERY INSTANCE ONLY ONE
INFORMANT FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE FURNISHED INFORMATION
REGARDING INDIVIDUAL POTENTIAL AGENT. DISCREETLY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AS INSTRUCTED. IF NOTHING DEROGATORY
DEVELOPED, AUTHORITY GRANTED TO INTERVIEW.

WTB:BJW
65-59264

HOOVER

BQM 1743-1815
Slev - 1830-1840
(u)

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

(# 021643) (u)

DECLASSIFIED BY: SP3-BJW/m
ON 6-14-2000

00-1164

G.I.R. 2-6-21-94
Classified by SP3-BJW/m
Declassify on: OADR
34225

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

370
51 FEB 23 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
F B I

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
FEB 5 5 32 PM '51
ORL
FEB 2 10 45 AM '51
RECEIVED
F B I
COMMUNICATIONS
FEB 5 11 03 AM '51
(u)

2 + Via Bureau Radio (2-2-5) 2:32 P.M. [Signature]

Tolson ✓
 Ladd ✓
 Clegg ✓
 Glavin ✓
 Nichols ✓
 Rosen ✓
 Tracy ✓
 Harbo ✓
 Belmont ✓
 Mohr ✓
 Tele. Room
 Nease
 Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(2-15-51)

NR 151930

3:29 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

G.I.R.-7

STAGE. SUMMARY OF PROGRAM. TO DATE 41 INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY AND CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED RECOMMENDING THEM FOR INCLUSION IN STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM. 29 AUTHORIZED INTERVIEWS STILL TO BE MADE. 30

HAVE BEEN MADE AND ALL BUT 6 OF THESE SUBMITTED TO BUREAU IN REPORT FORM WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT BUREAU AUTHORITY BE GRANTED FOR INTERVIEWS. 34 ADDITIONAL PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED FOR THIS PROGRAM BUT RECOMMENDED UNFAVORABLY IN VIEW OF INFORMATION IN BUREAU FILES, INFORMATION IN ANCHORAGE FILES OR DATA RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 13 LAST GIVING RECAPITULATION OF STATUS OF PROGRAM EN-ROUTE. PROGRAM CONTINUING TO RECEIVE PRIORITY.

RECEIVED:

(2-15-51) (u)

4:06 PM

RTL

6-21-51
 RECORDED - 25
 EX-4

59264 67
 (u)
 5-43

SP3-BTJ/1M

6-14-2000

00-1164

c.c. Mr. Belmont

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65-59264

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont ☒ _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (2) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(2-23-51) (2) (u)

NR 231845

2:38 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS OF PROGRAM. FORTY FIVE PERSONS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED, RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU TO DATE. TWENTY FOUR ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AUTHORIZED BY BUREAU AND ATTEMPTS BEING MADE TO LOCATE AND HANDLE. PRELIMINARY REPORTS ON TWENTY THREE ADDITIONAL PERSONS HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO BUREAU WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT AUTHORITY BE GRANTED TO INTERVIEW. THIRTY FIVE PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND NOT RECOMMENDED.

RECEIVED:

(2-23-51) (2) (u)

2:45 PM

RTL

RECORDED - 122

SP3-BTJ/TH

6-14-2000

00-1164

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (2)

62 MAR 2 1951 (2) (u)

(u) 65-59264

Referral/Consult

(u) (e)
FEBRUARY 20, 1951

RADIOGRAM

CHIEF, I. D. COPE

SAC, WASHINGTON

STAGE. (u) (e) (u) (e) (u)
REBULET (JANUARY ELEVEN) AND ALCHORAGE LETTER (JANUARY SEVENTEEN)
LAST. INSTRUCT AGENT PERSONNEL TO UTILIZE WORD CASE RESEARCH AND
OBTAINING INFO ON INDIVIDUAL NAMED RECORDED. CEASE USING PHRASEOLOGY SUCH
AS INFORMANT RECOMMENDED BLANK AS POTENTIAL AGENT UNDER THIS PROGRAM,
BLANK HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED CONCERNING INSTANT PROGRAM, BLANK RECOMMENDED
AS POTENTIAL AGENT, BLANK WOULD MAKE A GOOD MAN FOR INSTANT PROGRAM AND
SIMILAR WORKING. CONTEMPLATED REPORTS ON INDIVIDUAL AGENTS WILL BE

[REDACTED] AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD REPORTS
ERRONEOUSLY REFLECT ~~THE~~ INSTANT PROGRAM OF ESPIONAGE NOT BEING DEVELOPED
IN ALASKA HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH VARIOUS INFORMANTS AND CONTACTS. EIGHT
REPORTS BEING RETURNED ALCHORAGE ~~THE~~ CONNECTION THIS INCIDENT. CAREFULLY
REVIEW ALL REPORTS SUBMITTED ON RECOMMENDED STAGE CONTACTS AND MARK
SURE ~~THE~~ ABOVE RECOMMENDED PHRASEOLOGY DOES NOT APPEAR.

~~SECRET~~
FEB 20 4 39 PM '51
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
65-59264
co - Foreign Service Desk

SP3-BTS/m

00-1164

HOOVER

(u) (e)
NB 202158

62144
SP3-BTS/m
34225

220-2210
220-2210
220-2210

RECORDED - 136

EX-1
RECORDED

Sent via Bureau Radio (2/20/51) 7:15 P.M. Per [Signature] (u) (e)

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Nease ✓
Gandy ✓

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (2-1-51) (u)

NR 012200

5:36 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. SUMMARY OF PROGRESS. AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW VARIOUS PROSPECTIVE STAYBEHIND AGENTS HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE BUREAU AND ALL ASSIGNED FOR IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION. TWENTY PERSONS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY, RECOMMENDED BY THE ANCHORAGE DIVISION AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. OTHER INTERVIEWS BEING MADE DAILY BY THREE AGENTS WORKING FULL TIME AND TWO ADDITIONAL AGENTS WORKING PART TIME. IT IS NOTED MANY INTERVIEWEES ARE TRAPPERS, PROSPECTORS OR OTHERWISE ENGAGED IN VOCATIONS WHICH NECESSITATES THAT THEY RESIDE IN BACK COUNTRY WHERE INACCESSIBLE EXCEPT BY CHARTER PLANES, FISH AND WILD LIFE PLANE OR SNOW SHOES. BITTER COLD AND DIFFICULT FLYING WEATHER MAKE CERTAIN OF THESE TRIPS HAZARDOUS AND SLOW. CLOSING REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF ANCHORAGE OFFICE WILL BE SUBMITTED AS SOON AS ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS MADE. ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS BEING MADE ON NEW PROSPECTIVE AGENTS, REPORTS BEING COMPILED AND WILL BE SUBMITTED IMMEDIATELY.

RECEIVED

(2-1-51) (u)

5:53 PM

Referral/Consult
LH

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/PM

RECORDED - 119

FEB 27 1951 (u)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson

Ladd

Clegg

Glavin

Nichols

Rosen

Tracy

Harbo

Belmont

Mohr

Tele. Room

Nease

Gandy

(DECODED COPY)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(2-23-51)

NR 232145

5:32 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/00 BY 1043

JAN 23 1951

FEB 23 1951

Referral/Consult

BUREAU ADVICE REQUESTED RE THIS

MATTER.

RECEIVED:

(2-23-51)

5:38 PM

MW

UNDERLINED PORTION OBTAINED FROM GARBLE. AWAITING CORRECTION.

SP3-BTS/JM

G-14-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 73

21-55

65-59264-71

cc: Mr. Belmont

J-WB

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
STATES DEPARTMENT OF J

To: COMMUNICA ON.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEBRUARY 24, 1951

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, ANCHORAGE

RADIOGRAM
URGENT

RECORDED - 73 65-59264-71

EX-35 STAGE. REURAD (TWENTY-THIRD)

NOT DEEMED NECESSARY YOU PARTICIPATE AND NO

BUREAU REPRESENTATIVES WILL PARTICIPATE AT THIS END.

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

HOOVER

ESS:hke

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BJS/m
ON 6-14-2000

Classified by SP12 BTJ/8C
Declassify on: OADR 3/22/51

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

FEB 24 10 25 AM '51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 MAR 10 1951
Bur. Radio 2/24/51
MAR 10 1951

Per me

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *Dr*

FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK L* Referral/Consult

SUBJECT: STAY-BEHIND AGENTS PROGRAM IN ALASKA

DATE: February 26, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 3422571
DATE 6-21-94 BY SP2 BT8 KC

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the SAC, Anchorage advising him that the



The letter also advises of other [redacted]
[redacted] in connection with the Escape and Evasion Program.

Attachment
ESS:hb *hb*

59 MAR 9 1951

RECORDED - 59
72

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 28, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
 COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (Bufile (65-59264))

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/WD

ON

6-21-94

342251

Referral/Consult

Reference is made to Anchorage radiogram dated February 23, 1951 con-
 cerning a [redacted]

Attachment

65-298

JHW:vf

RECORDED - 114

EX-3

65-59264-73

65-59264

66 MAR 12 1951

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Belmont _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Jones _____
 Mr. Mumford _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____

n

~~SECRET~~

REGISTERED AIR MAIL

Date: February 23, 1951

To:

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ 342251
6-2-94 SP128TS15C

b7D

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject:

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

There are transmitted herewith two photostatic copies
of a [Redacted] (S) - (U)

The information contained in the enclosure should be brought
to the attention of the [Redacted]

You should, of course, be alert to report to the Bureau
any information which may be brought to your attention by the [Redacted]
which relates to the subject matter of the enclosure.

65-59,064

Enclosures
cc-Foreign Service Desk

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/ldw
DECLASSIFY ON: [Redacted] #342251
PER OGA letter dtd 7/20/98

WTB:ow

cc - 100-343644-18

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/98 BY SP4 bja/ldw

SAC, Anchorage

February 27, 1951

Director, FBI

ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

There are transmitted herewith two copies of the report of SA [redacted] dated 2-6-51 at Anchorage.

Instant report should be rewritten, in accord with Bureau instructions contained in Bulet 1-11-51 and Buread 2-20-51 entitled "Stage", in order to delete the objectionable phraseology contained in the synopsis and paragraph two, as underlined, on page one of the report. As you are aware, it may be necessary to disseminate copies of this report in the future and under no circumstances should the report erroneously reflect that instant program has been discussed with various informants and contacts. Furnish an original and two copies of the corrected report to the Bureau immediately. All incorrect copies of the report should then be destroyed by the Anchorage Office.

There are also enclosed two copies of a Loyalty Form received at the Bureau during July 1948, which contains background information concerning [redacted] who may possibly be identical with captioned individual.

Your attention is directed to the report of SA Albert Rundbaken dated 10-19-48 at Anchorage, entitled "Detention of 17 Little Diomed Island Eskimos By Russian Authorities on Big Diomed Island, August 6, 1948; Security Matter - R." On page 8 of the cited report, information is set forth to the effect that the Little Diomed Eskimos had been questioned by the Russian authorities concerning [redacted] operator of a small freight ship and questions were asked concerning the places to which he sailed and if he ever went to Point Barrow. It is noted questions were asked about individuals who were friendly with [redacted] and inquiries were made relative to the tonnage of his vessel.

Enclosures

62-93862

cc- 65-59264 ✓

WTB:ow;vjm

NOT RECORDED
71 MAR 4 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

50 MAR 8 1951

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

ORIGINAL FILE

As it appears that [] is possibly identical with captioned individual, and as it is apparent that the Russian authorities know his identity and have expressed an interest in his activities and associates, authority is not being granted to contact [] and he should not be given further consideration in connection with instant program.

b6
b7c

It is imperative that the indices of the Anchorage Office be thoroughly checked prior to submitting reports of this type. You should immediately call this matter to the attention of the Special Agents handling this program so that the initial report submitted will contain all information of relevancy concerning the individual under consideration as a Stay-behind Agent.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo *RB*

DATE: December 29, 1950

FROM : Mr. I. W. Conrad

CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage
in Alaska in Event of Invasion

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

Reference is made to the attached letter from Anchorage dated December 18, 1950, transmitting a map outlining a proposed method of handling radio communications from various Agents located around strategic areas in Alaska to a central control station.

The above mentioned letter requests views touching on the radio aspects of this problem from the Radio and Electrical Section.

This Section observes that a mobile radio headquarters unit would afford (1) additional security over a fixed station from the direction finding standpoint, (2) closer physical operation to the actual stay-behind Agents than a permanently located fixed station and (3) less desirable technical facilities than that afforded by a fixed station. This means that receiving antennas will be inferior to those which could be provided at a fixed station and outgoing messages would not have the advantage of higher power transmitters which could be utilized from such fixed locations. However, it appears that the weight of advantage is in favor of a mobile type operation, working as close to the stay-behind operators as possible in order to shorten the length of their communications lines. it being pointed out that they will probably

Referral/Consult

As a suggestion for the SAC, it is pointed out that the possibilities of these Agents working into fixed locations at least while such fixed military locations exist, should not be overlooked inasmuch as such operations would prove to be more satisfactory from a purely technical standpoint.

Regarding equipment, this is to advise that the Bureau has no stock on hand which is suitable for equipping a considerable number of undercover radio operators. In the event such a program is envisioned which would necessitate the FBI acquiring such equipment, it is believed that immediate steps should be taken to put such planning into effect inasmuch as our ability to acquire electronic equipment during war time will be necessarily limited. It would appear, however, that the military would be in the best position to handle all equipment including a variety of radio crystals which would assist in not only extending the time during which they could operate without being detected and located by direction finding equipment but also it would assist in establishing radio contact with the headquarters station.

In connection with the possibility of enemy detection of undercover radio operations once the location is overrun, it is my opinion, based on past

Attachment

RECORDED - 111

65-59264-74

RLM:AB

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BJS/SP

ON

6-21-84

342251

66 MAR 14 1951

1-31-51

experience that these Agents will be highly expendable inasmuch as initial detection by military radio receivers operating in the area would be followed immediately by portable direction finding operations which are capable of pin pointing the operating transmitter with a high degree of accuracy. I am assuming that the Russians will have basic knowledge of direction finding operations which is comparable to our information and that which was available to the Germans during the past war.

Finally, there is no doubt in my mind that radio jamming operations by the Russians would follow an actual invasion, if not immediately, certainly shortly thereafter. The enemy's objective would possibly be primarily concerned with the jamming of military communications networks and secondarily radar networks. Inasmuch as this stay-behind Agent operation would be on a more limited scale and actual time on the air would be of fairly short duration, it can be assumed that the jamming process might not be applied for some time. The most vulnerable part of the operation from the jamming standpoint would be that of the central station by virtue of the fact that it would be on the air more of the time thus making detection easier by Russian radio receiving equipment and further, that it would be employing higher power which would add to the ease of detection. Once the enemy has established that this circuit was a military or closely allied operation then it can be assumed that it would become a target for both direction finding work, with a resultant search by personnel or by bombing planes and secondarily assuming that these methods failed jamming procedures would be applied. In this event jamming would be resorted to in an effort to disrupt any communications attempted over the established circuits.

These comments and observations are based upon the present rather limited knowledge which I have of the contemplated operations.

ACTION:

Referral/Consult

Supervisor W. T. Baker is handling this program at the Seat of Government, however, prior to his answer to the attached letter it will be necessary to (1) add comments from the Cryptanalysis Section regarding (a) call letters and (b) codes. (2) [redacted] as well as [redacted] regarding the use of such a mobile radio station [redacted]

Referral/Consult

It is not believed that inv. program should be discussed with at this time. 113.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 12-18-50

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
 ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

CONFIDENTIAL

Referral/Consult

There is transmitted herewith [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

In selecting potential stay-behind agents, we have endeavored
 to pick persons living in close proximity to [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

It is suggested that the [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

An additional reason for [REDACTED]

The distance from Whitehorse to each of the strategic areas is
 shown in air miles.

Referral/Consult

The following observations and suggestions are being noted in
 order that this letter [REDACTED] may be studied by the radio
 experts in the FBI Laboratory for their comments, observations and
 criticism concerning its feasibility.

Enclosure

JHW:MR
 65-298

COPIES DESTROYED
 R 584 NOV 21 1969

65-59264-74

Pr. MS

EX-37

Let to Anch.
 1-31-51
 WB

DECLASSIFIED BY
 ON 6-21-12

1. Equipment

Referral/Consult

It is noted that some of the potential agents already contacted have radio equipment. Accent will be given to choosing other agents who have such equipment. This likewise can be used. For those agents who do not have equipment, the same will necessarily have to be furnished by the [redacted] FBI.

2. Frequencies

It is suggested that a minimum of four frequencies be given each agent. This will entail furnishing all agent radio transmitting sets with at least four crystals. It is further suggested that two of these crystals be for day transmission and two for night transmission, it being noted that transmission and reception in the Territory of Alaska is very inconsistent and quite probably more than one frequency will have to be used during one transmission from various points in the territory. Likewise, it is noted that the frequencies more adaptable to the various locations will have to be determined by tests which can be run after the system is installed.

3. Call Letters

It is suggested that different call letters be given to all stations and that these call letters be changed on a daily basis in order that any monitor or any station will not become well acquainted with a fixed call signal.

4. Codes

It is suggested that a uniform code cannot be used for all stations inasmuch as action of a quisling nature, corruption of one agent or capture of one station will place the code in the hands of the enemy. It is suggested that possibly this could be circumvented by the use of pads similar to those presently in use by the Bureau or a different code for each station.

5. Initiative in Calling

It is suggested that in considering the correspondence between the agents and the Control Station that the agents make the initial call with the control station monitoring the agents radio frequencies. In this manner the agent will only call when he has something to report. Otherwise he can make a sign of life call periodically on possibly a weekly basis.

6. Use of [redacted]

b7D

It is suggested that discussions be had [redacted] at the Washington

level and with the [redacted] in order that the mobile unit can be used [redacted]. This will not be necessary at the inception of this program, inasmuch as all necessary tests, trial runs, etc., can be made from various points on [redacted] listed above on the Alaskan side. However, it is pointed out that tests should be made at as many points as possible on the [redacted] the Alaskan side to determine the quality of reception and transmission.

Done | It is requested that this entire matter of radio communication be studied by the radio men in the laboratory and for criticisms, comments, and observations made available to this office. |

Done | It is requested that in making the comments the radio experts touch on the point of the danger of the enemy detecting and locating clandestine radio stations which are well hidden in the roughest kind of mountainous and wooded terrain, which terrain will not be accessible by roads or otherwise. |

Done | It is also requested that the radiomen touch on the point of the possibility of the enemy jamming the agents station or the control station. |

January 2, 1951

PERSONAL AFFECTION

62194 SPB BTJ (SC)

Reurlet 12-5-50 and Bulet of 12-18-50.

It is noted that urlet of 12-5-50 was an interim report on the progress being made in instant program and that Bureau comments were solicited as to the selection of agents and the proposed training program submitted by your office for Stay-behind Agents.

The proposed training program is being reviewed and modified at the Bureau and the FBI Laboratory is making the necessary preparations for appropriate instruction in secret inks and coded messages. You will be promptly informed of the Bureau's planned training program in this regard.

In connection with the selection of Stay-behind Agents, you made inquiry as to whether individuals should be considered as potential Stay-behind Agents if they have had prior military service or been employed by the U. S. Government. It is observed you recommended that men with prior military service not be excluded from consideration since it has come to your attention that many of them have the essential knowledge, stamina and experience in Alaska required for Stay-behind Agent material.

In previous correspondence, you were instructed to take into consideration the fact that a selected Stay-behind Agent may be immobilized, liquidated or deported immediately by the Soviets in the event he falls within any of the categories known to have been deported or liquidated by the Soviets in their occupation of the Baltic States and Eastern Poland. Individuals singled out for arrest by the Soviets after the invasion of the Baltic region of Europe included, among many others, employees of the forestry service, Government officials and civil servants as well as officers, military judges and volunteers of national armies.

Your attention has been called to the fact that the best Stay-behind Agents in urban areas from the standpoint of long range survival would be unskilled or semi-skilled workmen not engaged in any of the occupations indicated above and who were not officials of labor unions.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

EX-37 WTB:jvs

157 MAR 30 1951

It is suggested, therefore, that consideration of individuals as Stay-behind Agents in urban areas who have previous military service or have previously been employed by the U. S. Government be held in abeyance until this program of recruitment has progressed further. If it is determined that adequate coverage cannot be obtained without utilizing individuals in these two groups, the Bureau should be advised. You may possibly desire to consider these individuals, however, in the "reserve pool" of Stay-behind Agents, those who would be evacuated from the area of invasion and returned to the area of occupation at a later date for a specific assignment. The Bureau interposes no objection, however, to your considering the selection of Stay-behind Agents with prior military or government service in rural areas.

In connection with the reports which are being submitted currently by the Anchorage Office on individual potential Stay-behind Agents, every effort should be made to submit the full and complete name of the individual involved instead of merely using initials for the first and middle names. Bureau file searches can also be accelerated if the initial report submitted in these cases contains a complete personal description. When Bureau authority is granted to contact a potential Stay-behind Agent, and if a complete description is not previously available, same should be included in the subsequent report covering the interview of the individual.

By Bureau radiogram of December 12, 1950, the Anchorage Office was authorized to contact seven individuals whose names had previously been submitted as potential Stay-behind Agents. Advise Bureau identities of those who agreed to serve as Stay-behind Agents in the event of invasion.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

DATE: January 6, 1951

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-91 BY SP12 BTJ/SK

342251

PURPOSE:

To advise that the proposed training program for selected Stay-behind Agents in Alaska submitted by the Anchorage office has been reviewed by representatives of the FBI Laboratory, the Training and Inspection Division and the Espionage Section.

To submit proposed recommendations fixing the responsibility of the FBI in connection with instant training program.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

As you are aware, the Bureau [redacted] developing Stay-behind Agents in Alaska. These agents are presently being selected and will thereafter be trained. These individuals, it is contemplated, in the event Alaska is invaded by Russia, will remain in the enemy occupied area of Alaska and will be used to secure and supply intelligence information to the American Armed Forces.

Referral/Consult

In order to definitely fix responsibility in all phases of this matter, certain recommended proposals have been discussed with [redacted] on a headquarters level through the liaison section of the Bureau. In this connection, the Bureau to date has agreed to the following with respect to the training phase of captioned program:

1. The FBI will participate in the training of Stay-behind Agents.
2. The FBI will be responsible for furnishing training relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications except radio communications.
3. The FBI will furnish training in the preparation of coded messages and secret writing.

Attachment

WTB:bjc

RECORDED - 114

65-57214-75

EX-37

1-11-51
2-13-51
2-15-51

11/11/51
11/11/51

CHAS
11/11/51

11/11/51

The Anchorage office was instructed to furnish a proposed training program to the Bureau in this regard for review and approval. By letter dated December 5, 1950, a copy of which is attached, the Anchorage office submitted a recommended training schedule.

The proposed program submitted has been reviewed by representatives of the Training and Inspection Division, FBI Laboratory and the Espionage Section.

BASIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- b6
b7C
1. [redacted] as a result of a conference among the Supervisors in the Training and Inspection Division, pointed out that the training program should be based on the primary objectives of the Stay-behind Agents, namely:

- a. How to avoid detection.
- b. Knowing what intelligence information is desired and how to get it.
- c. Becoming acquainted with methods of communications to be used between the Stay-behind Agents and their principal.

- Referral/Consult
2. It was also proposed that consideration be given to the Bureau's training [redacted] [redacted] to be used in connection with instant program instead of utilizing Bureau personnel to handle the direct training of the Stay-behind Agents.

In the event the Bureau's part of the training program is to be handled by Bureau personnel, it was pointed out by the Training and Inspection Division that at the present time there are only three qualified police instructors assigned to Anchorage, two of whom are the Special Agent in Charge and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge.

3. Representatives of the Training and Inspection Division and the Espionage Section have pointed out that Stay-behind Agents should be trained on

an individual basis. It was agreed that individual training for Stay-behind Agents is sound training technique from the standpoint of security and is essential for the protection of the potential informant nets.

It is proposed that through liaison with [redacted] on a headquarters level it be suggested [redacted] that consideration be given to the Bureau's [redacted]

Referral/Consult

training of Stay-behind Agents in the subjects listed hereinafter. It could be pointed out that the operation of the program will be of paramount interest to the military and since it is believed that the training should be on an individual basis, the direct training of the Stay-behind Agents [redacted]

[redacted] In this regard, it is observed that [redacted]

[redacted] It is also pointed out that a substantial saving in manpower would accrue to the FBI if the instruction of the Stay-behind Agents [redacted]

4. In every phase of the training program, the element of security will be emphasized.
5. It is contemplated that the training of individual Stay-behind Agents will be effected in Alaska at a location agreed upon by [redacted] in Alaska and the SAC, Anchorage.
6. It is recognized that the recommended curriculum set out below will serve only as a basis for the training to be given by the FBI but that the extent of training in specific subjects will depend upon the background and capabilities of the individual Stay-behind Agent.

The proposed curriculum of the training to be handled by the FBI, as suggested by the Anchorage office, is set forth below, with accompanying comments and observations of reviewing Supervisors at the Bureau:

RECOMMENDED CURRICULUM

1. Indoctrination of Agents

- a. Give purpose of Stay-behind network
- b. Obligation of agents to the country
- c. Necessity for the network
- d. Determination of the country, the military and the principal to hold Alaska
- e. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- f. Suggested time for training -- 1 hour

Comments

It is believed that nothing should be said about "informant networks" to the Stay-behind Agent except as relates to his own personal sub-agents and informants. The over-all contemplated informant espionage set-up, as a security measure, should not be called to the attention of the individual Stay-behind Agent. The Training and Inspection Division suggested that the [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED] It is so proposed.

2. Organization of Espionage System

- a. General background of informant networks
- b. Outline of the various types of espionage systems
- c. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- d. Suggested time of training -- 5 hours

Comments

The Training and Inspection Division has questioned the need of this instruction. It was pointed out that a knowledge of "various types of espionage systems" would be of little value to the Stay-behind Agents and that the more information of this nature imparted

through instruction, the greater would be the security risk in the event one or more of the Stay-behind Agents were captured. It is proposed that this topic be deleted from the curriculum.

3. Russian Military System of Ferreting out Espionage Agents and How to Avoid Same

- a. Background of Russian Internal Security System
- b. Background of Russian formed espionage system
- c. Russian military procedure in invaded territory
- d. Soviet personalities
- e. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- f. Suggested time of training -- 8 hours

Comments

The Training and Inspection Division has questioned the need of this training and has suggested that the topic be changed to "Russian Military System of Ferreting Out Espionage Agents," and that emphasis be placed only on Russian military procedure in invaded territory. Further, that the balance of the suggested subject matter under Part 3 above be omitted. It is believed, however, that basic instruction should be given to Stay-behind Agents so they may be able, for example, to recognize the activities of the MGB, the GRU (Red Army Intelligence), and the MVD (Russian Internal Security Police). By being prepared to identify the presence of a Russian intelligence service in an occupied territory and to report on their activities would without question be of benefit to the Armed Forces of the U.S. From a practical standpoint, the presence of important Soviet personalities in an occupied area would certainly be of value to the Air Force which could possibly, upon receipt of the identity and location of a well known Soviet personality from a Stay-behind Agent, bomb the indicated target or location. It is proposed, therefore, that the topics in this category be included in the instruction to be given to Stay-behind Agents.

4. Basic Training in Use of Russian Dictionary

- a. Provide the trainees with inexpensive but adequate Russian-English dictionaries
- b. Place accent on Russian military terms
- c. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- d. Suggested time of training -- 16 hours

Comments

Supervisor P. A. Napier of the Translation Unit has pointed out that basic training in the use of the Russian dictionary is of limited value unless extensive language training is given; further, that it would be necessary to know the Russian alphabet before the dictionary could be used; that the printed letters of the alphabet are different from the script letters; and that the possession of identical dictionaries would constitute a security hazard. Mr. Napier does not believe this training is feasible considering the time element available. He pointed out that an average student would require at least two weeks of concentrated study to merely become acquainted with the Russian alphabet.

It is doubted that ^{numbers of} great Russian troops would be used in an invasion of Alaska. In observing operations in Korea at the present time, it appears that Chinese troops make up the bulk of the enemy attacking forces.

Due to the proximity of Siberia to the Territory of Alaska, it is assumed that Russia might probably utilize troops from the Siberian area which would include the Mongol, Uzbek, Kazakh, etc. As these groups do not necessarily speak Russian but have their individual languages and dialects, it is not believed that training in the use of the Russian Dictionary would be practical.

Special attention, however, is directed to point (b) above suggesting instruction on Russian military terms. It is proposed that instruction be given on Recognition of Standard Soviet Markings on Equipment and materials and Recognition of Uniforms and Insignia.

Referral/Consult

It is proposed that basic training in use of Russian dictionary be omitted, but that through

5. Codes for Radio Correspondence

- a. Radio correspondence ground to plane
- b. Radio correspondence between agent and principal
- c. Suggested number of trainees -- selected agents
- d. Suggested time of training -- 10 hours

Comments

In previous discussions

Referral/Consult

6. Secret Writing and Written Codes

- a. Types of secret inks
- b. How agent can manufacture secret inks
- c. Use of reagents
- d. Suggested number of trainees -- selected agents
- e. Suggested time of training -- 8 hours

Comments

This subject matter has been discussed with Mr. D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. Mr. Parsons advised that the Laboratory is now prepared to give the necessary instruction and various inks are being prepared in this regard. Mr. Parsons pointed out that 8 hours instruction per selected agent would be sufficient for this course of training and that in the event

approximately 5 days would be needed for secret inks and an additional period of 5 days for written codes. In the actual

Referral/Consult

instruction given to Stay-behind Agents, the practical aspects of this topic should be emphasized, that is, actual practice in coding and encoding messages and use of inks. Stay-behind Agents should also receive instruction as to the proper manner of preparing a summary type, effectively worded message.

7. Cover Stories, Pretexts, Deception and Security

- a. Need for identity and necessary reason for agent's presence in a particular locality.
- b. Methods of advising principal if agent has been identified as such, corrupted and forced to operate as double agent
- c. Methods of concealing secret codes, maps, implements and supplies
- d. Methods of destroying espionage gear to avoid detection and same falling into hands of enemy
- e. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- f. Suggested time of training -- 8 hours

Comments

The subject matter of this topic is pertinent, however, the title of same is being changed to "Deception and Security." The Training and Inspection Division has suggested that in connection with instant topic, a short lecture be included on "What can be concealed on the person?"; further, that a short discussion on "How to detect and lose surveillances" be added. It is proposed that instruction be included on "What can be concealed on the person", however, that the discussion of "How to detect and lose surveillances" be limited to a discussion of what the Stay-behind Agent should do and how he should act in case he is placed under surveillance by the Russians. Hunters and trappers will be used as Stay-behind Agents in rural areas where surveillances would not be a problem. The urban areas will probably be decimated and limited to Russian Army establishments which would also limit any problems arising from surveillances.

8. Methods for Agents to Use in Selecting and Training Sub-agents and Informants

- a. Necessity for security
- b. Careful direction for exact mission
- c. ~~X~~ That agent divulge no data regarding the Stay-behind Agent network
- d. Care in selecting sub-agents and informants
- e. Availability of desired information to sub-agent
- f. Methods of transmitting information from sub-agent to agent
- g. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- h. Suggested time of training -- 10 hours

Comments

For effective operation of the Stay-behind Agent program and in order to provide for the necessary resulting adequate coverage, the subject matter of this topic is probably one of the most important. It is proposed, however, that point (c) above not be mentioned during the course of instruction. As previously pointed out, Stay-behind Agents should not know one another's identity, and should not be informed of the existence of the Stay-behind Agent or "espionage network". It is proposed that a discussion on "What to do when someone approaches agent with proposition to act as a sub-agent or informant?" be included.

It is also proposed that in connection with this subject matter, instruction should be provided on action to be taken when the Stay-behind Agent is "uncovered" by the Russians in order to continue the use of the sub-agents and informants that the Stay-behind Agent has developed.

The necessity of security will be emphasized in this matter especially as relates to the "contacts" effected by the Stay-behind Agent to develop his individual informant or sub-agent network.

9. Administration of Plan from Agents Point of View

- a. Data re food caches to which he will have access
- b. Data re materials needed
- c. How to request needed equipment and supplies
- d. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- e. Suggested time of training -- 1 hour

Comments

The Training and Inspection Division has pointed out that the items to be covered in instant topic should be limited to subjects taught by the FBI and [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

10. Suggested additions to Curriculum

- a. The Training and Inspection Division has suggested that the [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

Comments

It is proposed that inquiry be made through [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

- b. Instructor N. A. Watson of the Training and Inspection Division has informed that [REDACTED]

b2
b7E


Referral/Consult

Comments

It is proposed that this matter be discussed with



- c. It is noted the suggested curriculum submitted by Anchorage does not reflect instruction on what information of an intelligence nature would be desired in the event Alaska is invaded. It is proposed, therefore, that an additional topic be included in the training program entitled "Intelligence Information Desired from Enemy Occupied Area", since transmittal to the agent of requests on specific intelligence targets may not be possible at the outset of the occupation.



Referral/Consult


It is further proposed that



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10/1

- d. No mention is made in the suggested curriculum submitted by Anchorage relative to the subject of "Photography".

In previous discussions



Referral/Consult

ACTION:

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the above proposals be approved for discussion [redacted] through liaison on a headquarters level. Specifically, it is recommended that the Bureau. [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the FBI [redacted]

[redacted]

Thereafter, the Anchorage office should be informed of the specific responsibilities recognized by the Bureau in connection with the training phase of this program and provided with the curriculum approved by the Bureau in this regard.

1/12

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 12-5-50

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTJ/SC
 ON 6-21-94

Reference is made to Bulet dated 11-29-50. 842251

There is set out hereinafter an interim report on the Stay-Behind Agent Program, indicating its status in this Division, progress being made and certain difficulties which have been encountered.

Referral/Consult

With Anchorage letter of 11-16-50 there were transmitted
 two enclosures: (1)

(2)

memo Belm 1/8/51
 12-11-50
 memo add to Dir: 12-18-50
 12-18-50
 Let to Anchorage
 12-18-50

copy 4/10/51

COPIES DESTROYED

JHW:MR

65-298

R 584 NOV 23 1960

COPIES DESTROYED

R 584 NOV 21 1960

RECORDED - 11:65-29864-75

59 MAR 20 1951

S. B. White

AN File 65-298

SELECTION OF AGENTS

There has been no intention to set or limit the number of potential agents selected, inasmuch as it is well-known that a number of our prospects upon contact will decline to act; a number will be found to lack qualifications which we desire; and some, no doubt, will be qualified and agree to act and then later change their minds.

It is recommended that men with prior military service not be excluded from this program inasmuch as in considering the best prospects who

AN File 65-298

have come to our attention we find many of them have had military service. Likewise, these men have the qualifications, stamina and knowledge which is being sought. Also, certain of them are bush pilots and own airplanes; certain of them own shortwave radios and are able to operate the same; and some are licensed big game guides or have other qualifications from which excellent results could be expected. Also a number of these ex-military men are located in the wilderness as hunters, trappers, etc., and would be caught there in case of invasion and would have to stay in the Territory. This they know. It is the opinion of the military and other individuals with whom I have talked and in whose judgment I have confidence, that it will be virtually impossible to clear out all inhabitants from the interior or even find them and such persons could be used to excellent advantage. It is requested that the Bureau comment on this particular angle. A loss of ex-servicemen would probably deprive the program of some of its best material.

It is also recommended that persons who are or have been employed by the Federal Government not be excluded from participation in the Stay-Behind Agent Program. It is noted that probably such persons as employees of the Fish and Wildlife Service, CAA and other federal employee groups have the best knowledge of the interior of the Territory of Alaska as compared with any other persons. By the same token, a number of the Fish and Wildlife men with whom I am personally acquainted fit the qualifications of prospective agents better than any persons we have considered thus far. It is recommended that the Bureau comment concerning this group.

The selection of prospects for stay-behind agents has been made and will continue to be made from personnel known to the agents assigned to this division and with the advice of individuals whose integrity is thought to be unimpeachable. This latter group includes such persons as Judge ANTHONY J. DIMOND, Federal Judge, Anchorage, Alaska; Judge HARRY PRATT, Federal Judge, Fairbanks, Alaska, and HOLGER LARSEN, Fish and Wildlife Agent, in charge of the Anchorage Office, Fish and Wildlife Service. In contacting these men, the real purpose of our inquiry has not been divulged. However, it is noted here that HOLGER LARSEN has spent much of his life in the interior of the Territory of Alaska, is possibly as good a woodsman as there is here, is a man of the highest integrity and who I am sure would be more than willing to participate with us in any manner in this program. The services of such a man should not be lost.

Administrative files are being opened on each prospect obtained under the 66 classification, using the character "Administrative". It is believed that some more identifying designation should be used in the character and is suggested that the Bureau may desire to note the full character as "Administrative - SBA" or "Administrative - EE". In this manner the reports can be more easily routed in the Bureau. Any information contained

AN File 65-298

in the files of the Anchorage Division or obtained from persons who are contacted on the highest confidential basis will be included in the report in accordance with instructions from the Bureau in referenced letter.

There is set out hereinafter a complete list of the persons who are being considered at this time as prospective stay-behind agents. It is noted that none of these individuals has been contacted by agents here in connection with this program and it is recommended that they not be contacted until the preliminary investigative report is sent in, the program has progressed further and the training phase of the program is ready.



b6
b7C

FOSTER R. SIMS





b6
b7C

TRAINING

Referral/Consult

Inasmuch as both the Bureau and this office feel that the training in the interest of economy and efficiency should be done in the Territory of Alaska, it is felt that its best location would be at Fort Richardson which is located at Anchorage, Alaska. However, in this regard [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] It is pointed out that setting up training schools in Anchorage proper is not deemed advisable. All locations which are suitable would, of course, be known to too many persons in town. The agent trainees in many instances will be well-known to the citizens of Anchorage and to each other to be in Anchorage for any length of time without the entire plan and its participants being of general knowledge in the Territory of Alaska. It is felt because of the size of Fort Richardson and the fact that most of its inhabitants are military personnel and strangers to the Territory, the agent trainees could come and go there without creating too much curiosity and speculation. However, inasmuch as it is impossible to obtain housing for the training school on Fort Richardson Base at the present time, attempts will be made to obtain the same in Anchorage or its proximity if the Bureau so desires.

It is recommended that the Bureau discuss the matter [redacted]

[redacted] The time of conducting the training school, can not be decided upon, of course, until the names of proposed agents have been obtained, checked through the files of the Anchorage Division [redacted] central files of the FBI in Washington, [redacted]

[redacted] and any other files that the Bureau may deem necessary; a preliminary investigation has been made by the Anchorage Division and they have been interviewed.

Referral/Consult

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Memo -
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
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Anchorage
12-12-50

With reference to the investigations conducted concerning the prospective agents, it is recommended that it be limited in scope in the communities in which the agents live, particularly if such communities are small. This will avoid the entire community obtaining knowledge that the Bureau is interested in such individual and ultimately in their knowing all concerning the program.

With reference to the number of persons in a training class, it is, of course, believed that the agents should be trained individually if possible. However, this does not appear to be possible in view of a lack of sufficient time and a lack of a sufficient number of qualified instructors. Also it would prove to be very expensive. It is felt that instruction could be given in classes of from 12 to 20. Agents in any particular class could be selected from various sections of the Territory so that there would be no two agents from the same section. In addition, if there were several instructors available, they could break the class of 12 down to groups of 2 or 3 and give the training in several different buildings, thus keeping the agent trainees separated.

With reference to the length of the class necessary to train the agents, it is noted that a curriculum is set out below and the length of time estimated to be consumed by the Bureau is approximately 67 hours. However, this time may be changed after the curriculum is reviewed by the Bureau Laboratory experts who possibly will revise the estimates. It is felt that all agent trainees can work a ten-hour day, classes continuing from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., with appropriate lunch and dinner hour.

Referral/Consult



The curriculum of the training to be handled by the FBI is as follows:

Begin here →
1. Indoctrination of Agents

- a. Give purpose of stay-behind network.
- b. Obligation of agents to the country.
- c. The necessity for the network.
- d. The determination of the country, the military and the principal to hold Alaska.
- e. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- f. Suggested time for training --- one hour.

2. Organization of Espionage System

- a. General background of informant networks.
- b. Outline of the various types of espionage systems.
- c. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- d. Suggested time of training --- 5 hours.

3. Russian Military System of ferreting out Espionage Agents and How to Avoid Same.

- a. Background of Russian Internal Security System.
- b. Background of Russian formed espionage system.
- c. Russian military procedure in invaded territory.
- d. Soviet personalities
- e. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- f. Suggested time of training --- 8 hours.

4. Basic Training in Use of Russian Dictionary.

- a. Provide the trainees with inexpensive, but adequate Russian-English dictionaries.
- b. Place accent on Russian military terms.
- c. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- d. Suggested time of training --- 16 hours.

5. Codes for Radio Correspondence

- a. Radio correspondence ground to plane.
- b. Radio correspondence between agent and principal.
- c. Suggested number of trainees --- selected agents.
- d. Suggested time of training --- 10 hours.

6. Secret Writings and Written Codes

- a. Types of secret inks.
- b. How agent can manufacture secret inks.
- c. Use of reagents.
- d. Suggested number of trainees --- selected agents.
- e. Suggested time of training --- 8 hours.

7. Cover stories, Pretexes, Deception and Security

- a. Need for identity and necessary reason for agents presence in a particular locality.
- b. Methods of advising principal if agent has been identified as such, corrupted and forced to operate as double agent.

- c. Methods of concealing secret codes, maps, implements and supplies.
- d. Methods of destroying espionage gear to avoid detection and same falling into hands of enemy.
- e. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- f. Suggested time of training --- 8 hours.

8. Methods for Agents to Use in Selecting and Training Sub-Agents and Informants

- a. Necessity for security.
- b. Careful direction for exact mission.
- c. That agent divulge no data regarding the stay-behind agent network.
- d. Care in selecting sub-agents and informants.
- e. Availability of desired information to sub-agent or informant.
- f. Methods of transmitting information from sub-agent to agent.
- g. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- h. Suggested time of training --- 10 hours.

9. Administration of Plan from Agents Point of View


- a. Data re food caches to which he will have access.
- b. Data re materials needed.
- c. How to request needed equipment and supplies.
- d. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- e. Suggested time of training --- 1 hour.

To be

It is suggested that the Bureau review the above outlined curriculum to determine whether in its opinion all subjects for which the Bureau is responsible have been covered and elaborate upon or delete from the subjects set out.


Referral/Consult

AN File 65-298

Supplies and Equipment

With reference to supplies and equipment for that portion of the training for which the FBI is responsible, it is suggested that the curriculum contained in this memorandum be reviewed with the Laboratory experts who are qualified to advise concerning such matters.

The supplies and equipment necessary for stocking caches for stay-behind agents will, of course, vary according to the needs of the individual agent. This matter

Payment of Agents

Referral/Consult

It is believed that the payment of agents should be handled individually and every effort should be made to obtain their services at the least possible expense to the Bureau. However, the first thing to be considered in the way of expenditures of this nature is for transportation of agents to the training school, housing and board while the agents are in school and in a number of instances the agents will have to be reimbursed

34 Aug 1965
12 12-65

for money lost during the time they are away from their respective businesses. In Bureau letter of reference dated November 29, 1950 it was stated that during recruitment and training stages of the program expenses could be handled on an individual basis and paid as are the regular confidential informants in the field. In this regard it is noted that the [redacted]

[redacted] This, of course, is not adequate. By way of giving the Bureau an insight on possible expenditures, a few necessary items and their expense are noted below:

Plane fare from Nome to Anchorage and return ---- \$108.00 without tax.
Plane fare from Fairbanks to Anchorage and return -- \$60 without tax.
Plane fare from Kodiak to Anchorage and return --- \$63 without tax.
Hotel reservations in Anchorage --- \$5.00 to \$7.00 daily.
Meals in Anchorage (average) --- \$6.00 to \$8.00 per day.

It was [redacted]

This office is continuing to give this matter diligent attention.

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: February 13, 1951

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-22-94 BY SP12 BTJ/S
342251

PURPOSE

Referral/Consult

To advise of [redacted] concerning
the Stay-Behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion
Program in Alaska.

BACKGROUND

Referral/Consult

As you know the Bureau [redacted] responsible
for the developing of a Stay-Behind Agent Program and an Escape
and Evasion Program in Alaska. The Anchorage Office is presently
recruiting Stay-Behind Agents to be used in the event of an
invasion of Alaska. Plans for the Escape and Evasion Program are in-

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A series of conferences have been held by Supervisor
Edward S. Sanders and [redacted]

[redacted]

RECORDED - 114

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ESS:lae

60 MAR 19 1951

Referral/Consult

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/HBW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
PGE 66A Neta dtd 7/29/98

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult *My memorandum to you dated January 6, 1951, discussed in detail the recommendations made by the Anchorage Office concerning training for Stay-Behind Agents. Reference memorandum recommended this matter [Redacted] and made certain comments concerning each of the proposals of the Anchorage Office. Supervisor Sanders has discussed this suggested curriculum [Redacted]*

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult *In connection with the suggestion of the Training Division that the Bureau [Redacted] to give that portion of the training which the Bureau has agreed to furnish.*

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

The SAC at Anchorage has noted that

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

RECOMMENDATION

Referral/Consult

The foregoing is for your information. It is noted that instructions have been given to Supervisor Sanders to place this matter on the next IIC Agenda in order that the Director can advise the other IIC members of the progress made. This matter will be closely followed and you will be kept advised of developments.

[Handwritten signature]

SAC, Anchorage PERSONAL ATTENTION

February 27, 1951

Director, FBI

AIR MAIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 22 94 BY SP2 BTJ/SC

342251

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 114 65-59264-77

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

If not already done, you should
contact [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

For your information. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

A conference was held with [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

ESS:ejj:pam

65 MAR 13 1951
FEB 27 1951
COMM - FBI

You will be kept currently advised of the developments
of this program insofar as it pertains to Headquarters coordination.

LLR

CHB

WHS
CS

VKA

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

FROM : A. H. Belmont *ah*

DATE: February 26, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-22-94 BY SP12BJT/80
 342251

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PURPOSE:

Referral/Consult

To advise that [redacted]

To recommend that the Bureau

interpose no objection to [redacted]

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

As you are aware, [redacted] on
 October 25, 1950, was advised that the Bureau agreed in principle

As of today, 41 individual residents of Alaska have been investigated, recommended and have agreed to act as Stay-behind Agents in the event Alaska is invaded. This ground work has been done by the Anchorage Office. The development of this phase of the program is continuing until such time as [redacted] the Bureau agrees that the coverage is adequate.

Referral/Consult

It will be necessary to train these persons in order to prepare them for operations, and the Bureau has agreed to participate in the training [redacted]. The majority of the subjects considered, because of the military nature of this undertaking, [redacted] the Bureau has agreed to furnish instruction relative to "Russian Military System of Ferreting Out Espionage Agents," "Secret Writing and Written Codes," "Deception and Security," and "Methods for Agents to Use in Selecting and Training Sub-agents and Informants." The subject matter for which the Bureau has recognized responsibility can be given in Alaska. Conferences are presently being held [redacted] through the Liaison Section as to whether the Bureau will [redacted] to handle the Bureau's subjects, or whether the Bureau will provide FBI personnel to give the instruction directly to the selected Stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

65-59264

WTB:jvs

RECORDED - 114
 EX-37

65-59264-77
 MAR 2 1951

VF

Referral/Consult

In the above [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

The above examples are being brought to your attention so that you will be aware of the proposed action on the part of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

It has been the Bureau's position since the inception of this program, that Stay-behind Agents should be trained individually and that they should not know the identity of one another.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] the Bureau's opinion that these agents should be trained individually in order to preserve security and identity.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Bureau interpose no objection to the proposed plan of [redacted]

[redacted] as long as these persons are transported and instructed individually.

Referral/Consult

John J. Jones

SAC, Anchorage

January 31, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-22-94 BY SP12 BTG/SC
342251

Referral/Consult

Bulet December 13, 1950 transmitting [redacted]

[redacted] It is noted that you requested that the entire matter of radio communication be studied by the radio men in the FBI Laboratory and that their comments and observations be made available to the Anchorage office.

There are transmitted herewith two copies of a blind memorandum reflecting results of the study made of this matter by the Radio and Electrical Section of the Laboratory.

Referral/Consult

Your attention is directed to Bulet to Anchorage dated November 29, 1950 wherein you were advised that [redacted]

In connection with your suggestion that discussions be held with [redacted] in order that the mobile unit can be used [redacted] this is to advise that instant matter will not be discussed [redacted] at the present time. The suggestions made by you relative to proposed radio communications for Stay-behind Agents will be [redacted] at SCG and you will be advised of the [redacted] in this regard.

Enclosures
65-59264

b7D
Referral/Consult

cc - Keay

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EX-20

MAR 2 1951

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FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FEB 1 4 49 PM '51

SAC, Anchorage

March 6, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVER UP IN ALASKA IN
THE EVENT OF INVASION

There are transmitted herewith two photostatic
copies of an article entitled "The Russians in Alaska's
History" which appeared in the February 24, 1951 issue of
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, a weekly publication
prepared by The Joint Committee on Slavic Studies.

The above is submitted for your information and as
of possible interest in connection with captioned program.

65-59264

Enclosures

WTB:mem

RECORDED - 25

INDEXED - 25

EX-22

MAR 7 1951

-79

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MAR 16 1951

The Russians in Alaska's History

THE TRUTH ABOUT ALASKA. (By G. Agranat and M. Cherenko. Literaturnaya gazeta, Jan. 9, p. 2. Complete text.) A voluminous book lies before us. Published: Stuttgart, 1950. Author: Fritz Bartz, professor at Kiel University. Theme: Alaska, past and present.

The interest in Alaska manifested in Stuttgart may appear rather strange at first glance. Really, don't the professors of Trizonia have more vital food for speculation closer at hand? But upon dipping into Bartz' book it becomes quite evident that it was made to order. The guise of a "scholarly work" conceals American propaganda's current forgery.

Distorting history with the zeal of a lackey, Bartz disputes the generally recognized priority of the Russians in the original discovery and exploration of Alaska and defames the Russian settlers. He asserts without a shade of embarrassment that, in alleged contrast to the Spaniards (?) and the Anglo-Saxons (?), the Russians left nothing in Alaska, after a rule of more than a century, except wretched huts for fur collection.

In recent years the U.S. press has reverted time and again to the subject of Alaska. Having turned Alaska into a "land aircraft carrier" and a military base for aggression against the Soviet Union and the countries of the Pacific, the American imperialists are not averse to adorning themselves in the toga of civilizers and patrons of culture.

Revising history in retrospect, the American imperialists portray matters as though the Yankees had saved Alaska from "Russian barbarism," brought it the benefits of notorious "Western civilization" and developed the Alaskan economy.

It is for this purpose that the learned lackey from Kiel University has now been enlisted.

But authentic history and the true facts are not on the side of the Yankees and their lackeys.

I. — When the Russian Grigory Shelikhov founded the first Russian settlement on Kodiak Island in Three Saints Bay at the end of the 18th century, no West European had set foot in the vast northern expanses of the American continent beyond the 140th meridian.

From the very first days of their settlement in Alaska, the Russians began to show the indigenous inhabitants the "potentialities and advantages" of agriculture and of Russian buildings, dress and food. From the Russians the Indians learned to cultivate gardens and sow grain. Shelikhov opened a school in Alaska for children of the Indians and Aleuts. "I must render this people their due for their keen intelligence," he wrote, "for their children have quite rapidly... learned to speak Russian so that they can be understood without difficulty."

Shelikhov was the first to found large civilized settlements in the American North and to develop crafts and trades. Alexander Baranov, the first governor of the Russian American possessions, succeeded in carrying out Shelikhov's plans. He founded Russian settlements in various places in Alaska and built the city of Novo-Arkhangelsk, the capital of Russian America, on Sitka Island.

The beginnings made by Shelikhov and Baranov were followed up by Kupreyanov, Wrangel, Tebenkov and other rulers of Russian American possessions.

"A considerable amount of iron ore has been found," wrote Baranov in one of his reports, "and iron has been forged as an experiment. There is thus hope of creating iron foundries useful to the fatherland." Later coal was discovered; in the middle of the 19th century more than 20,000 poods were mined monthly. Mica was found in Kenai [Cook] Inlet and copper along the Copper River. Bells cast by the Russians of Alaskan copper still hang in Cali-

fornia churches.

Numerous workshops in the Russian settlements smelted metals and forged all sorts of tools. Cloth was produced from native raw materials. Sawmills, flour mills and tanneries were in operation. Ships that sailed to Hawaii, China and the Philippines were built in the dockyards. Steamships, the first built on the entire Western coast of America, were turned out in Novo-Arkhangelsk in the 1830s. Not a single part was imported for these vessels; everything, including the engines, was produced on the spot.

The Russians tirelessly studied the country in which they lived. Fearless explorers, accompanied by Indian warriors, crossed the mountain ranges and penetrated deep into Alaska. By the middle of the 19th century the Russians had produced maps and atlases of the northwestern coast as far as San Francisco.

Pharmacies, a hospital, a theater, an extensive library and a large picture gallery existed in Novo-Arkhangelsk as early as the beginning of the 19th century. From 1841 an observatory was in operation here; the reports of its observations were published in the Annals of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences.

It is characteristic that Indians and Creoles (children of mixed marriages) studied along with the Russian children in the schools of Russian America. In addition to providing a general education, the schools gave training in crafts, trades and business. The more gifted youngsters, including Creoles, were sent to St. Petersburg for further study. It is also illuminating that Creoles occupied important positions in the service of the company, even as heads of departments (districts) and ships' captains.

Even foreign visitors, not in the least interested in singing the praises of the Russians, were obliged to write:

"I was pleasantly surprised when I saw the peace and harmony in which the Russians live amidst these uncouth children of nature. Having conquered them, the Russians exercised their influence not by instilling [in the natives] fear of their conquerors, but, on the contrary, by gaining their love through favorable treatment*** The Russians are on a quite friendly footing with all the inhabitants of this land***" (Vancouver, the British explorer of the end of the 18th century.)

Of course, there were also dark sides to the life of Russian America. The directors and the aristocratic grandees ensconced in the St. Petersburg administration wallowed in speculative operations and took little interest in the everyday life of a handful of Russians forsaken across the ocean.

There were two Russias: the Russia of the serf-owning landlords and the Russia of the people, the democratic Russia. The settlers who came to the Russian overseas possessions belonged overwhelmingly to this second Russia. Those who emigrated across the ocean came from the northern provinces, where there was no serfdom, or were Siberian peasants of soldiering folk, with a considerable number of runaway serfs among them who had suffered under serfdom and hated it fiercely. The settling of Alaska by the Russians bore a clearly marked laboring and democratic character dissimilar to the trading and plundering colonization by the Anglo-Saxons, who recruited their agents from among tramps, adventurers and criminals.

II. — Bartz is silent about the fact that by the middle of the 19th century Alaska lay athwart one of the chief routes of American expansion. The Russians were obstructing American capitalism from consolidating its positions in the Pacific. That is why the Russian possessions in America became a mote in the eye of the American states. The history of Russian Alaska is also the story of how the Yankees

drove northward to menace Russia, China and Japan from the North.

The foreign pirates and poachers, mostly British and American, incited the Indians against the Russians. Schooners were dispatched to the coasts of Russian America. There was not a single pound of grain aboard these vessels. Their cargo consisted of rum, alcohol, whiskey and guns. Foreign merchants flagrantly violated the trade agreements that pledged them to deliver food and various goods. American whalers arrogantly descended upon the banks frequented by sea animals.

The Tsarist diplomats pursued a policy of concessions with respect to Russia's overseas possessions. In 1867, taking advantage of the weakening of Russia as a consequence of Tsarism's defeat in the Crimean War, the United States bought Alaska for a paltry sum—five cents a hectare.

As far back as in 1868 Congressman R. G. Walker declared that "in the final struggle for world domination the Pacific will hold the deciding role. The acquisition of Alaska and the Aleutians brings America halfway to China and Japan. Only shortsighted individualists and cranks who wish to see the U.S. western frontier on the Ohio can object to this acquisition."

From the moment they took possession of Alaska, the Americans treated it as a conquered and occupied colony. Alaska was completely turned over to the military. Companies of whalers and trappers worked hand in hand with the military. The slaughter of whales brought mass starvation and caused the Eskimos to die off. The herd of many million fur seals in the Pribilof Islands was reduced to 125,000 by the beginning of the 20th century. The sea otter was almost entirely killed off. The manufacturing and farming enterprises created by the Russians were almost completely put out of existence. "In Sitka," writes Bancroft, "many buildings turned into ruins*** The port was likewise ruined*** The arrival and departure of the mail boat were the only events breaking the lethargy of the inhabitants of once flourishing Novo-Arkhangelsk."

The noted American historian Dole had every reason to write: "There are few who will read the history of Alaska between 1867 and 1897 without indignation."***

Even in those years Alaska interested the Americans primarily as a political-military springboard, as a base for expansion to be used against the countries of the Pacific and, above all, Russia. From Alaska, back at the end of the 19th century, smugglers, traders' agents and all manner of spies, not infrequently disguised as "Arctic explorers," carried out their marauding on Chukotka and Kamchatka. From Alaska the U.S. railway magnates, headed by the

elder Harriman, father of the notorious warmonger, early in the 20th century wished to extend a railroad trunk line into Siberia (via a tunnel under the Bering Straits) in order, first economically, then by military seizure, to detach the very rich regions of northeastern Russia. From Alaska, in the Soviet era, the American-Canadians sought to seize the Soviet island of Wrangel.

III.—Bartz devotes more than half his work to the present-day economy of Alaska. He is enthusiastic about the "friendship" between the American colonizers and the indigenous population, evidently meaning by this word "friendship" the ruthless racial discrimination and the gradual extermination of the Indians and Aleuts.

It is futile to seek in this book an answer to why Alaska's economy has been steadily degenerating since the famous "gold rush" and "copper boom." The Americans themselves note that in the past ten or 15 years gold mining has dropped 66% and the fish catch 50%. Has Alaska's natural wealth been exhausted? Or is the U.S.A. short of manpower to exploit these natural resources?

No, these are not the reasons. The riches of Alaska, in the past as today, interest the American monopolies only insofar as they can be looted unhindered and without contributing to the economic development of the land. Today the monopolists see no profit in development of Alaska's economy because the transformation of this territory into a military camp promises to be infinitely more profitable. Even before the beginning of the American adventure in Korea, according to data of the Alaska Weekly, 54% of the able-bodied population was engaged in nonproductive branches of the economy associated with military requirements.

Dozens of air bases and airfields equipped for bombers have been created in Alaska. Annual maneuvers are held in which large units of the army and navy take part.

Latterly the Americans have turned from plans for using Alaska as a base of aggression to direct action: troops and military cargo are now being shipped to Korea via airfields in Alaska and the Aleutians. According to information in the Alaskan press, more than 120 four-motored transports are engaged in these shipments.

Alaska thus has already become in fact a "land aircraft carrier," a springboard of aggression, in the gory adventure precipitated by the American fascists on the fields of Korea.

Such is the truth about Alaska, its past and present, the truth which the Yankees and their obliging lackeys strive to conceal.

SAC, Anchorage

February 28, 1951

Director, FBI

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION

There is transmitted herewith one photostatic copy of a self-explanatory communication, marked "Secret," dated [redacted] together with one ~~SECRET~~ (U) photostatic copy of the enclosure referred to in that communication.

The above is forwarded as of possible interest in connection with captioned program.

Enclosure

Referral/Consult

65-59264

WTB:jpa

~~cc - 100-343044-718~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/28/97 BY SP12 BTJ/SC
342-251

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY 604 bjk/hlw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 2342257
Per OGA letter dtd 7/20/98.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

165-59264
NOT RECORDED
144 MAR 30 1951

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~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY

100-343044-718

MR. A. H. BELMONT

February 28, 1951

MR. C. E. HEYNRICH

MAJOR SAMUEL P. BORZILLERI

342251
2-7-94 SP287318C

SAC Foster of Indianapolis advised me today that while he was in Washington he contacted an old friend and classmate, Major Samuel P. Borzilleri, who can be reached through Government Code 131, extension 65484, or at his home, Ordway 4543. Borzilleri, according to Foster, during World War II was in charge of an Escape and Evasion Program operating out of Italy which was active in recovering downed flyers in enemy territory, much of which is Iron Curtain country.

Referral/Consult

Borzilleri indicated to Foster that he was recently contacted [redacted]

Foster stated that Borzilleri is dependable, although temperamental, and some of the stories that he tells sound bizarre. Foster said, however, he does not believe Borzilleri would relate any stories which were not factually correct. He believes Borzilleri has a wealth of information regarding escape of evasion tactics; that he gained the impression that Borzilleri expects to be contacted by American Intelligence Agencies in order that the information in his possession may be utilized.

Foster stated that he indicated to Borzilleri the Bureau would probably be interested in information in his possession and stated that if an Agent contacts him that it should be specifically stated that the contact is a result of his previous conversation with Foster.

OBSERVATIONS

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In connection with the Bureau's Stay Behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs of Alaska, and further in view of the allegations regarding [redacted]

Referral/Consult

NOT RECORDED
133 APR 28 1951

Referral/Consult

[redacted] it is felt that
Borsilleri should be interviewed by a well-qualified Agent
in order to obtain from him such information as he may have.

It is noted that the Field generally is not cognizant of the Bureau's activities in the Stay Behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs. For this reason, it is felt that the Supervisor in the Espionage Section handling this Program should conduct the interview with Borsilleri.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Supervisor William T. Baker be authorized to contact Borsilleri and interview him without disclosing to him the fact that the Bureau is conducting a Stay Behind Agent Program in Alaska. At the same time he should obtain from him any information regarding [redacted] together with information which he mentioned to Foster regarding [redacted]
[redacted]

Referral/Consult

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (e) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(3-8-51) (e) (u)

NR 081945

5:22 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. REBURAD (FEBRUARY 20) LAST. ALL REPORTS CONTAINING PHRASES TO BE DELETED HAVE BEEN CORRECTED AND RE-SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. FIFTY-ONE PERSONS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED TO DATE, RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. AUTHORITY HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM BUREAU ON 30 OTHERS. THESE HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED AND AGENTS PRESENTLY ON ROAD TRIP ATTEMPTING CONTACTS. IT IS NOTED A NUMBER OF THESE ARE UNAVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEWS AT THIS TIME, BEING IN THE STATES OR IN SOME ISOLATED SECTION. REPORTS ON 13 ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU AND AWAITING AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. REBULET (FEBRUARY 27) LAST. DIRECTING DISCUSSIONS WITH

MATTER WILL BE HANDLED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS RETURN.

RECEIVED

(3-8-51) (e) (u)

5:26 PM

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/pm

VAM

00-1164

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 143

EX - 99

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (e) (u)

65-59264

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(3-1-51) (u)

NR 012115

7:16 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

RE STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 49 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO INTERVIEW 21 ADDITIONAL PERSONS, CASES ASSIGNED AND EFFORTS BEING MADE TO CONTACT AND HANDLE. PRELIMINARY REPORTS SUBMITTED ON 26 OTHERS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUREAU AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. ANCHORAGE MEMORANDUM DATED 27 INSTANT (u) FORWARDED SETTING OUT DATA REGARDING [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

RECEIVED:

(3-1-51) (u)

7:32 P.M.

MML

SP3-BTS/JM

6-14-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 92

48

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

65-59264

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(3-15-51)

NR 151826

2:24 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, RE STATUS REPORTS. 60 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL
 STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU.
 RESULTS OF CONFERENCE WITH [REDACTED]

RECEIVED

(3-15-51)

2:30 P.M.

LL Referral/Consult

(U)

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/JM

per OGA LETTER 7-20-98 #00-1164

CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjs/Hdw

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

per OGA LETTER 7/20/98

6-14-2000 SP3 BTS/JM 00-1164, 7/20/98, 7/20/98

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic system.

60 APR 4 1951

65-59264

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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(3-22-51)

NR 230005

8:41 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 65 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS RE THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. 50 ADDITIONAL PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND CASES RE THEM CLOSED AS BEING NOT QUALIFIED. 13 ADDITIONAL PERSONS REMAIN ON WHOM BUREAU HAS GIVEN AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW BUT THESE HAVE BEEN UNAVAILABLE FOR VARIOUS REASONS SUCH AS BEING IN STATES OR IN COMPLETELY ISOLATED AREAS. CONTINUED EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO CONTACT THESE. 6 ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO BUREAU AND THIS OFFICE AWAITING FURTHER AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. MATTER CONTINUES TO RECEIVE PRIORITY.

RECEIVED

(3-22-51)

8:51 P.M.

LL

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

SP3-BTS/VM

6-14-2000

60-1164

6-22-94
 Classified to SP3-BTS/VM
 Declassify on: OADR 642251

MAR 29 1951

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

60 APR 4 1951

65-59264

SAC, Indianapolis

March 15, 1951

Director, FBI

MAJOR SAMUEL P. ~~FOREILLERI~~
SOURCE OF INFORMATION

There is attached a copy of a memorandum prepared at the
Seat of Government which reflects the results of an interview conducted
with the above-captioned individual. This is being furnished to you for
your information.

¹¹
Enclosure

~~65-59624~~

By R. L. & Agent (B)

WAB:jo

RECEIVED
MAR 22 1951
SP 12 BT 818
342251

RECEIVED DIRECTOR
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAR 21 1951

26 85

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

DATE: March 2, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-22-94 BY SP12B/STL

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PURPOSE:

To summarize progress being made by the Anchorage Office, and to suggest that the observations of SAC Williams relative to the necessity of implementing this program during the summer months of 1951 be brought to the attention of OSI headquarters.

BACKGROUND:

By letter dated February 13, 1951, the Anchorage Office set forth a recapitulation of the Stay-behind Agent Program as follows:

Strategic Areas

Referral/Consult

Stay-behind Agents

In considering individuals as potential Stay-behind Agents, the Anchorage Office is enlisting the assistance of persons who are in good health, loyal, and who are, according to confidential informants and contacts, reliable. Their knowledge of the territory where they reside and their ability to survive in the "back country" are taken into consideration. Where possible, those individuals who have had experience in operating short wave radios, have "ham" licenses and who either own or can fly airplanes are considered. Persons who have had experience in caching supplies, mushing dog teams, and who are experienced in handling small boats are being sought. Persons who own or have access to cabins located in secluded and strategic areas, those who live on and can observe highway and railroad traffic are likewise being considered for use in connection with the captioned matter.

Referral/Consult

A numerical goal has not been set, however the enlistment and development of Stay-behind Agents will continue in Alaska until the Anchorage Offices of FBI determine that coverage is adequate and the Bureau

50 APR 9 1951
WFB:jvs

RECORDED - 49

APR 5 1951

3

Forty-one Stay-behind Agents have been investigated, agreed to act and have been recommended by the Anchorage Office for use in this program. Thirty-one individuals under consideration have not been recommended due to reasons of health, personal habits, security or indications reflecting they intend to leave the territory in the event of invasion.. Authority has been given to Anchorage to contact approximately 65 additional prospects and the development of this phase of the program is continuing. The Anchorage Office has pointed out that 60 degree below-zero weather has hampered operations somewhat in effecting some contacts, and in some instances, it will be necessary to make contact with these individuals when they make their annual visit to "the city."

The Anchorage Office has recommended that during the period of training, efforts be made to fingerprint and photograph these Stay-behind Agents. This procedure appears to be sound and will be considered in connection with the training program.

Referral/Consult

Communications-Radio

As you are aware, [redacted]

The Anchorage Office has pointed out that considerable time and effort will be necessary to transport radios, power units and necessary accessories to points of location in Alaska; that the summer is the only season which lends itself to this function. The Anchorage Office has further advised that almost a whole year will be lost if something is not done in this respect during the summer of 1951. SAC Williams likewise indicated that the only practicable time to carry in materials, build caches and draft maps of same is the summer season. It was stressed that if this project is not begun in the summer of 1951, it will necessarily have to be put off until 1952 with the resulting loss of approximately one year's time. SAC Williams has suggested that these matters be brought to the attention of [redacted]

Caching

The Anchorage Office is in the process of compiling a dossier on the caching of supplies, arms, ammunition, gasoline, radios and other Arctic survival gear. The dossier will include the following:

1. Essential items to be cached

2. Places for caching
3. Manner of sealing cached materials
4. Mapping and Marking caches
5. Amount of caching materials .
6. Choosing cache locations and methods of transporting supplies to cache location
7. Building of caches.

Referral/Consult

SAC Williams stated that [redacted]

[redacted] nevertheless, he believes that time is of the essence and if the program in this respect is not accelerated and something done on it during the summer of 1951, it will have to be deferred until the summer of 1952 because of the weather, terrain and other evident obstacles natural to the territory of Alaska.

Life and Supply Line

Referral/Consult

The Anchorage Office is giving consideration to the establishment of a "lifeline" for the Stay-behind Agents. It is contemplated that it will be necessary to supply them from time to time with arms, ammunition, food, clothing and other necessary gear essential to their existence. The Anchorage Office is making a study of the most logical mountain passes, air routes and logical spots for landing by pontoons, skis and wheels. SAC Williams has pointed that although it is contemplated that [redacted]

[redacted] the Anchorage Office, nevertheless, is going ahead compiling data on the subject which can be utilized at a later date.

Liaison between FBI [redacted] in Alaska

SAC Williams has informed that [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Comment:

Referral/Consult

By Bulet to Anchorage 2-27-51. it was pointed out that





RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that through the Liaison Section, the observations of SAC Williams relative to the necessity of accelerating captioned matter in Alaska during the summer months of 1951 be brought to the attention of [redacted] to avoid the loss of a period of one year in its development and implementation.

Referral/Consult

It is likewise recommended that the observations and comments be obtained in this regard, and that inquiries be made as to



also in this regard, see
Bulet to Anchorage 4-6-51
WS.

Referral/Consult

SAC, Anchorage

April 5, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

There are transmitted herewith two photostatic copies
of an article entitled "Russia Can't Take Alaska" written by
Father Bernard R. Hubbard, S. J., with Bill Davidson, which
article appeared in the March 31, 1951, issue of Collier's Magazine.

The enclosures are submitted for your information.

1:4 ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Attachment

65-59264

MB:emr

EX-100

RECORDED - 134

APR 8 1951

- 88

U S DEPT OF JUSTICE
FBI

RECEIVED READING ROOM
APR 5 5 11 PM '51

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Russia Can't Take Alaska

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 17

British Columbia or the state of Washington.

The difficulty posed by an air attack would leave just one other alternative open to the enemy—to land forces on the barren coasts or in the wilderness, with the objective of advancing overland to take Anchorage and Fairbanks. *And this, I contend, is absolutely impossible.* Aside from the few inhabited areas, the Alaskan wilderness is so wild, so impenetrable, so deadly, that any military force would be engulfed and destroyed in it without our having to fire a single shot.

The Russians know this. The Alaskans know this. But the armchair strategists look at the map and continually discover easy avenues of invasion to the Anchorage-Fairbanks defense perimeters. Often, for instance, they hit on the undefended Alaska Peninsula which stretches invitingly toward Siberia and originates at Cook Inlet, at the head of which sits Anchorage.

This will give you some idea of what this "easy" invasion route is like:

Peninsula Expedition Fails

In the summer of 1928, I headed an expedition which tried to traverse the narrow neck of the peninsula for a distance of only 100 miles. For three months I went into training with a Swiss-American giant named Jack Koby and Santa Clara University football star Roderick Chisholm, and then we attempted to penetrate to the Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes, the site of a 1912 volcanic eruption. It had been visited by human beings only once before, when a National Geographic Society expedition broke through in 1916.

We cut inland from the Gulf of Alaska, intending to strike across the Katmai area and emerge on the Bering Sea slope of the peninsula. From the very first day, we got bogged down in a morass the like of which no modern army ever has seen.

We struggled through deserts of volcanic ash in which we sank to our knees with every step, and we nearly strangled from the constant dust in our nostrils. When we got through the ash, we fell into quicksands up to our armpits; and then we inched our way up uncharted precipices and across treacherous glaciers. We crawled through ghost forests destroyed by showers of volcanic acid, and every day we were drenched by torrential rains and flung about by sudden 100-mile-per-hour gales that rushed through the mountain passes from the Bering Sea. All this time there wasn't a trace of living game, and we existed on canned foods from the 120-pound packs we carried.

Finally we had to give up and turn back. We had spent the months of June, July, August and September on the expedition, and in all that time we had covered a grand total of 30 miles. We were three husky, well-trained men, unimpeded by extra equipment. A military force never could have penetrated beyond the first 10 miles!

Another favorite pastime of the armchair strategists is to look at the map and discover wide, flat, invasion corridors along the great east-west rivers of Alaska. They see the mighty Yukon, particularly, and wail that a mechanized enemy could land at the river mouth on the Bering Sea and roll directly up the flatlands to Fairbanks.

In 1939, I led an expedition up a similar Alaska river, the Noatak, which empties into Kotzebue Sound on the west coast and flows roughly west and south like the Yukon. The object of this expedition was to find out if the headwaters of the Noatak

originate anywhere near the Colville River which flows north to the arctic. Such a discovery would provide a pipe-line route down the two river valleys, and enable us to tap fully our potentially great oil fields at Point Barrow. This would prove invaluable to our defense, because Barrow is ice-locked 10½ months out of the year, while Kotzebue on the Bering Sea is open as a port all summer.

Again I rounded up the strongest men I could find and we started up the river in a flat-bottomed boat. This trip was pure torture. We ran aground on innumerable mud bars, and the river had so many tributaries that we never knew whether we were on the Noatak or on some dead-end branch. We turned around and hunted for the main channel time after infuriating time, and nearly every day we suffered an ice-water bath in a rapids or a whirlpool.

After six weeks of this, we made 150 miles—with the help of two trips back to the river mouth for additional gasoline and supplies. Then we set out on foot across the tundra. And this was where the real nightmare began.

The tundra or muskeg which covers about one fourth of Alaska consists of waist-deep water with long-rooted clumps of vegetation growing out of it. When you move across this swampland, you try to step from one clump of vegetation to the next, but more often than not you slip and fall into the water with your 100-pound pack.

While you are struggling along thusly at the rate of about a half mile a day, you are constantly surrounded by clouds of mosquitoes. These insects are so vicious that in the days of Russian rule in Alaska, a form of capital punishment was to stake a convicted criminal out in the wilds and allow the mosquitoes to bite him to death. There also are black gnats and tiny invisible insects, called "nosee-ums" by the Indians, which burrow into the skin around the hairline and cause violent infections.

In addition to this, the 100-mile-an-hour arctic storms hit you when you least expect them, pelting you with sleet and rain and loose rock, and knocking you flat with the fury of their blasts. In the face of all these tribulations, we made 20 miles in two months—and again the expedition had to be abandoned.

Problems That Confront an Enemy

Multiply that mileage figure by 30, and you will have some idea of the problems that would beset an enemy if he landed at the mouth of the Yukon and tried to roll up the "flat, open corridor" to Fairbanks—more than 600 miles upstream, with swamp and tundra nearly all the way.

Some armchair strategists have suggested that mechanized equipment could use the tundra like a highway when it freezes in winter. But again the map studiers are wrong. A thin coating of ice forms on the tundra with the first frost in September, but then the early snows act as insulation and the water underneath rarely freezes. As our own armed forces found out when they strayed more than a few yards from the Alcan Highway on the Operation Sweetbriar maneuvers last winter, the frozen tundra often can scarcely hold a sled, let alone a tank.

If Russian paratroopers were to land on the Kenai Peninsula and move up the Alaska Railroad to Anchorage, they would again face the tundra, plus some of the roughest mountains in the territory, with only one easily defensible route, Moose

Pass, leading through them. If they kept to the railroad tracks, they would be totally exposed to our air forces and could be bombed and strafed to destruction. The same thing would happen if they dropped on the Alcan Highway and moved toward Fairbanks from the rear. On the narrow strand of the road they would be bombed; off the road there would be the tundra and the mountains and the impenetrable forests.

They would find, moreover, that even the immediate vicinity of our cities and military bases is impassable. Just across Knik Arm from Anchorage, for example, the Susitna River marshes are as wild as the Yukon tundra, 500 miles away.

Elements Create Real Peril

In 1935, I was investigating unmapped volcanoes with an expedition just a few miles from Cold Bay in the Alaska Peninsula, now the site of a military airfield. Suddenly the sky turned pitch-black between the spires of the Aghileen Pinnacles. It was one of Alaska's terrifying, unpredictable storms, and the rains came down by the bucketful. Before we had time to think, whole mountainsides of rock and alder brush moved down on us, and the entire six-mile-wide valley where we were standing became a rushing torrent of water, 20 feet deep. We escaped because we managed to clamber onto a gravel bar, but a regiment caught in that valley would have perished—within artillery range of the airfield.

Even the long-settled Panhandle area paralleling British Columbia has terrain that is unbelievably wild, with uncharted mountains towering right down to the ocean's edge.

In 1927, for example, I was the first man to cross the Taku Glacier and discover what is now known as the Juneau Icecap, stretching all the way to Canada. This little expedition, into an area forbiddingly called "the Spirits' Home" by the Indians, took 76 hours, during which I had no sleep and lost 28 pounds. We were burned by the sun; we nearly were killed a dozen times in broken-rock masses; and we finally had to be rescued by a Captain William Strong who courageously sailed up the savage Taku River to the point where he had guessed we would emerge.

The weird thing about all this is that it took place in a region just a few miles outside Juneau—in an area that was settled in the late 1700s.

It is no wonder that when the U.S. Navy set up a base on 100-mile-long Kodiak Island, it did so without fear of attack from the rear. For the interior of the island is so impenetrable that no enemy would possibly launch an attack across it.

When the Japanese occupied undefended Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands in World War II, they were still 2,500 miles from Anchorage and they got no farther, despite the fact that the territory was wide-open to any major attack.

We abandoned our air base at Nome, on the Bering Sea, recently, knowing that it would mean nothing to the Russians if they took it. With hundreds of miles of tundra and swamp between them and our Anchorage-Fairbanks fortress, they would be up a dead-end street—and they would be no more than 20 minutes' flying time beyond their own bases in Siberia.

The trouble with most American thinking about Alaska's military problems is that we consider them in terms of past wars, most of which were fought in inhabited

areas that had roads, farms and villages. From the time of Alexander the Great, armies have lived on the land as they advanced, hijacking vast quantities of food and booty from conquered populations. Even in World War II, communiqués contained lines like, "The Red Army advanced 50 kilometers in the direction of Dresden today, capturing 53 villages." It was the villages that were important—not the kilometers.

In most of Alaska, however, there are no villages to speak of, no food, and no roads—until you get to the built-up Anchorage-Fairbanks area. Alaska is about two and one half times the size of Texas; yet you could put the territory's entire population into Soldier Field, Chicago, and still have plenty of seats left over for general admission.

Alaska comprises 586,400 square miles. Scarcely 1,000 square miles, or less than one fifth of 1 per cent, are inhabited; and, according to Department of the Interior figures, only 12,000 acres, or the incredibly low total of 18 square miles, are under cultivation. Some 200,000 square miles consist almost wholly of impassable mountains, and 150,000 square miles are equally useless swamp and tundra.

Alcan Highway Construction Costly

There are only 591.1 miles of railroad in the entire vast area, and a miserly 2,926 miles of roads (compared with 195,812 miles of rural roads in Texas). Most of the roads are part of the Alcan Highway system—one of the most expensive experiments in the history of engineering. We used the best road-building equipment in the world and spent millions of dollars in constructing the Alcan, yet much of it still washes away when the arctic thaws descend on it each spring.

With all this, it is no wonder that of Alaska's 128,643 people, nearly all live within our Anchorage-Fairbanks defense perimeters, or in the Panhandle far to the southeast. Less than 1,000 Indians and 100 whites are strung out along the entire length of the Yukon River Valley in Alaska, and some 5,000 Eskimos are scattered in settlements along the Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean coast lines.

These Eskimo communities, more than anything else, tend to prove my point. In 1938, I piled nine King Island Eskimos into a primitive walrus-skin boat called an umiak and traveled 2,000 miles in the open sea visiting every Eskimo settlement between Nome and Barter Island—to help prove scientifically that all Eskimos speak a common language.

A startling feature of this trip was that I found not a single Eskimo living more

Collier's for March 31, 1951

than 10 miles inland. After generations of experience, the natives have found that the interior of Alaska is too much of a death-trap even for them: in an area three times the size of Korea, there is not a single pound of food to be found.

And that's why I say an invading army would starve here in a week. To be sure, there might be an effort to supply it by air. But such an unprecedented air lift would be almost impossible. The supply aircraft would have to fly over 1,000 miles, through the most treacherous flying weather in the world, and it would be a simple matter for us to harass them with planes based in southeast Alaska and throughout the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

Suppose, however, that the impossible did occur, and the Communists took over Alaska and managed to subsist in a region that produces only 5 per cent of its own food. What would they do then? Presumably, their object would be to invade the United States from there, or bomb our big industrial centers. For either project, they would have to bring in military equipment in the same difficult manner. And there would be other, even more awesome, obstacles.

An invasion of the United States from Alaska could be launched over only one possible land route: the Alcan Highway—1,523 miles of exposed road winding through an impenetrable tangle of tundra and mountain, in Canada as well as Alaska. From Dawson Creek, British Columbia, the southeastern end of the Alcan Highway, there is another 470 miles before the invaders would reach the first town of any consequence—Edmonton, Alberta.

This means that for 1,993 miles—more than twice the distance from Berlin to Moscow—the invading army would be strung out over a narrow ribbon of road, exposed to air attack every foot of the way, and unable to take cover because of the tundra and mountains and forests on either side. And they still would be many miles from the heartland of North America.

It is scarcely credible that the Russians would want to use Anchorage and Fairbanks to bomb our industrial cities. A look at the map shows why. There are dozens of bases in continental Russia that are only a couple of hours farther by air from Detroit, Chicago and Seattle—with railroads and other arteries running directly from the Communist factories to the bombing planes.

It is equally incredible that the Reds would want to seize Anchorage and Fairbanks to keep us from using those bases to bomb Russia. A high-ranking Air Force general recently told me that Alaska is so difficult to supply that in the event of offensive war we would use it mainly as a rescue

station and emergency-landing base for planes returning from bombing missions. "It actually would be easier," he said, "to bomb Russia from Omaha than from Fairbanks."

This general agrees with me that the Russians are not likely to strike in Alaska. So do other authorities with whom I spoke when I was in the Territory a short time ago.

These experts are American Eskimos, who, in admirable defiance of Soviet edicts, paddled across the Bering Sea last summer to visit their relatives on the East Cape of Siberia. They told me that there are no offensive preparations at all in this area, which is immediately opposite Alaska. They saw anti-aircraft batteries in the low-lying hills behind the coast, and they heard of purely defensive short-range fighter-plane airfields—with not a single major air base closer than Kamchatka, 1,000 miles away.

Moreover, their relatives told them that the Russians are afraid to build important installations in the East Cape area because it is too near large camps of slave laborers who might revolt and seize the bases in the event of war.

Why We Need Alaska

This leads to an important question: If Alaska is so worthless, why do we want it?

In the first place, it is absolutely necessary, from the purely defensive point of view, for us to maintain a solid line of outposts away from our shores. Today, our so-called Western Defense Perimeter begins at the North Pole and runs through Alaska and then down through Japan, Okinawa, Korea and Formosa. This protective belt consists of: (1) naval bases from which we can patrol our Pacific approaches against atom-bomb-carrying submarines; (2) air bases, to assist the naval patrol and provide fighter opposition against attacking enemy planes; and (3) in the case of Alaska, at least, a base for our great radar screen. The Russians don't need Alaska for their defense because they get even better protection, for their purposes, from a similar defense perimeter along the Siberian coast line.

In the second place, we must retain Alaska because of its future potentialities, which have been demonstrated so dramatically in the modern cities of Anchorage and Fairbanks and in the agricultural miracle that is the Matanuska Valley. There we now can raise almost anything that grows in New York State (with the exception of corn). In the 22-hour arctic summer daylight, moreover, the crops grow twice as fast, and huge specimens of melons and vegetables have been produced, despite the short three-month growing season.

Today, there are plans afoot that can convert several million additional acres of wasteland to this phenomenal agricultural production. I have proposed a project, for example, to dig a canal reuniting the great Kuskokwim and Yukon Rivers, which once were one stream similar to the Mississippi-Missouri river system. This would drain the surface water from the tundra and swamp of the vast Yukon basin and open up untold acres of rich bottom land, like the Mississippi delta, to the farmers. It also would stimulate settlement and road building up to the arctic mountain ranges, so that the now inaccessible mineral wealth of that region could be tapped for the first time. All these monumental plans, however, would take at least 100 years to fulfill.

The Russians, therefore, could conquer Alaska if they cared to wait until a century from now, when the territory could support a population of 15,000,000 people (and invading armies) as the result of the aforementioned projects.

Today, however, I would like nothing better than to see the entire Red Army attempt to conquer Alaska. The Russians would be swallowed up by the wilderness as surely as Almighty God caused the Egyptian army to be swallowed up by the Red Sea.

THE END



Russia CAN'T Take Alaska

By FATHER BERNARD R. HUBBARD, S.J. with BILL DAVIDSON

"The Alaskan wilderness is so wild, so impenetrable, so deadly, that any military force would be engulfed and destroyed in it without our having to fire a shot," says the famed Glacier Priest

Father Hubbard is a Santa Clara University geologist who has spent the last 25 of his 62 years exploring the unknown areas of Alaska and other polar regions. He is considered one of the world's foremost experts on the arctic. Recently he has been teaching survival techniques to armed forces personnel.

The subject of Alaska's military vulnerability is a controversial one. A great many authorities—including General Dwight Eisenhower and the Territory's Governor Ernest Gruening—feel that it is wide open to attack. Gruening last year testified in the Senate that "we could be taken by an airborne invasion of not more than two divisions."

Father Hubbard strongly opposes this view. Collier's presents his opinions here in the belief that his wide experience in the area entitles him to be heard.

ALASKA'S delegate to Congress, E. L. Bartlett, recently stated on a television broadcast that Russian paratroopers poised in Siberia could conquer Alaska's great air bases in 48 hours. At about the same time, there was a report from Taihoku, Formosa, that the Russians had massed 300,000 crack troops opposite Alaska, and were ready for an irresistible blitzkrieg on the territory.

This is tommyrot.

Such glorified rumors have become more and more persistent of late. Many of them are demonstrably silly.

A short time ago, an American pilot flew up the international date line in the Bering Sea along the 2¾-mile-wide strait separating Russian-owned Big

Diomed Island from American-owned Little Diomed. It was an exceptionally clear day and the pilot took an aerial photograph of the Soviet territory. The picture, published in Alaska's newspapers, caused international panic. For, according to the analysts, the photograph showed a military airfield across the sugar-loaf top of Big Diomed! The headlines screamed that this meant there were bombing planes and some 2,000 Russian soldiers massed just 2¾ miles from vital U.S. territory!

While the Big Diomed jitters were at their peak, I went to Little Diomed Island to fill in as a missionary for the famous Father Tom Cunningham, who had just been called back to service with the U.S. Army. With me was an Eskimo boy from the

Collier's for March 31, 1951

The Territory is just a jumble of lofty mountain ranges and impassable tundra, Father Hubbard declares. What appears to be an easy invasion route to Anchorage along the Alaska Peninsula is actually a volcanic morass; the "corridor" from the Bering Sea to Fairbanks is even worse; Alcan Highway is a deathtrap

mainland, a member of the Alaska Territorial Guard named Edward Magaluk. We kept staring at the bulk of Big Diomed, and one day Magaluk said, "I smell a big fog coming. A good man could sneak across to Big Diomed, have a look around, and get back before the fog lifts."

A half hour later, Magaluk was in his kayak, paddling silently through the pea-soup Bering Sea mists, toward the ominous humpbacked island that is Russia's closest outpost to the United States.

He hit the Big Diomed shore and hid his kayak among the rocks. Then he scaled a 700-foot cliff and slipped between the two sentry posts we had studied through our binoculars. He cut back and forth over the grassy, three-square-mile area on top of the rocky hump of the island, and he peered into the island's sole government building, a stone hovel in which a handful of Russians were reading or working on weather reports. Just to be sure, Magaluk bisected the top of the island again, slipped into the Eskimo village on the far side of the hump, and counted the Russians in their sentry posts.

Finally, he paddled back across the narrow strait as stealthily as he had come. His report was what I had expected.

No Airstrip on Big Diomed

"There is no airstrip on the island," he said, "and there are only 28 Russians, most of them civilian weather technicians." Later, government experts re-examined the aerial photograph and discovered that the airstrip was merely a light streak across the negative.

This incident typifies the fear complex we have built up about the Russians and Alaska. Scarcely a day goes by that someone does not claim the Soviets could walk in and take our great northern bastion at will in the event of war. I am not a military expert, but Alaska has been my scientific laboratory for 25 years—and to all of these scare stories I can only deliver a one-word answer: "Nonsense!"

For one thing, I do not think the Russians could capture Alaska if they wanted to. Secondly, I don't think the Reds are foolish enough even to want to invade the huge wasteland. For, contrary to general belief, the territory is not a land of gold and furs for the taking, but a subcontinent that is more than 99 per cent uninhabited wilderness. Gold and fur production, in fact, have declined by nearly half since their peak years earlier in the century, and the great natural resources are still untapped and undiscovered. Science unquestionably will change all this in future generations; but for the time being, Alaska as an offensive base is more a financial liability than an asset, even to us.

These statements may shock most Americans and I know they will bring down the wrath of the civilian military sages and politicians on my head—but they are opinions founded on a lifetime of exploration in a part of the world that has never even been visited by many of the armchair strategists.

My basic contention is this: our two mighty air bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks are the only Alaskan targets presently worthy of an enemy attack. Because these areas are so limited in size, Lieutenant General William E. Kepner has been able to draw all his forces into formidable, radar-protected defense perimeters around them. A direct airborne assault on either would be as suicidal as dropping paratroopers into the cone of an active volcano. The same thing holds true of bombing attacks—with the added factor that any bombed airfield normally can be put back into action in a matter of two or three days.

I firmly believe that if the Reds were strong enough in the air to attack Anchorage or Fairbanks, or the distant Juneau Panhandle region, they would be strong enough to by-pass Alaska altogether and land on the coast of (Continued on page 80)

Collier's for March 31, 1951



U.S. Little Diomed Island (foreground) is less than three miles from Soviet Big Diomed (rear)

PHOTO BY FATHER HUBBARD



JOHN FLOREA

Father Hubbard says Reds would find Alaska a liability if they did succeed in invading it




PHOTO BY FATHER HUBBARD

Coast line at Tracy Arm shows problem confronting an enemy attacking by sea

Alaska Peninsula is tangled wilderness; 30-mile trip here once took Father Hubbard four months

U.S. ARMY PHOTO



Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(3-29-51) NR 292315

7:33 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 66 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY
 BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS RE THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU.
 6 ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED AS SOON AS SAME
 CAN BE TYPED. EFFORTS CONTINUING TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW PERSONS
 AUTHORIZED FOR INTERVIEWS.

RECEIVED
 CORRECTED

(3-29-51)
 (3-29-51)

7:39 P.M.
 9:43 P.M.

LL

Referral/Consult

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/JM

00-1164

RECORDED - 55

65-59264-89

EX-123

cc: Mr. Baker

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

(5 APR 14 1951) (u)

65-59264

1-WB

SAC, Anchorage

April 4, 1951

Director, FBI

**PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)**

A review of the following case files reflects that the Anchorage office was granted authority to contact the individuals named below in connection with this program as indicated but that no reports have been received at the Bureau indicating that the desired contacts have been made:

Bufile 62-93581	Bulet 1-17-51
" 62-93525	" 2-9-51
" 62-93527	" 1-12-51
" 62-93517	" 1-11-51
" 62-93522	" 1-11-51

Expedite these contacts and advise Bureau results immediately by submitting a report in the individual case file.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/90 BY SP2W/BT/1000
342251

✓ 65-59264

62-93581
62-93525
62-93527
62-93517
62-93522

RECORDED - 107

EX - 48

APR 9 1951

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

WTB:jef

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI

RECEIVED READING ROOM
APR 4 3 36 PM '51

MAILED 13
APR 5 1951
COMM - FBI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: March 15, 1951

~~SECRET~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(65-59264)

Referral/Consult

34225
6122194
Classified by 75128 JIS/SC
Declassify on: OADR

CLASSIFIED BY SP7 Cw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
DATE 5-12-93 REMAIN IN CLASSIFIED PER OLC
C.A.H.

b1

b1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

JHW:MMA

65-298

COPIES DESTROYED

RECORDED - 121

EX-86

HANDLED BY
STG DESK

61 APR 14 1951

MAR 30 1951

~~SECRET~~

Y Ba Wa

65-59264

Letter to the Director, FBI

March 15, 1951

~~P & C~~

~~SECRET~~
PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

11
This matter continues to receive priority attention
in this office.

Referral/Consult


SAC, Anchorage

April 4, 1951

Director, FBI


PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Relet Anchorage to the Bureau dated 12-5-50 listing the names of the following individuals as potential Stay-behind Agents:



b6
b7C

Reference is also made to Anchorage radiogram to the Bureau dated 12-8-50 advising that the additional persons named below are being considered under this program:



b6
b7C

Expedite submission of preliminary reports on the above-named individuals.

65-59264

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 ATG/SC

WTB:jef

RECORDED
EX-49

65-59264-92
APR 9 1951

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

APR 14 1951

APR 5 1951
COMM - FBI

RECEIVED
APR 4 1951
15. 14 92 6

SAC, ANCHORAGE PERSONAL ATTENTION
DIRECTOR, FBI

April 6, 1951
31 1951

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF EVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

ReBulet January 2, 1951.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/25/90 BY SP12 BTG/SC

The proposed training program for the Stay-Behind

Agents has been

and the suggestions made in your letter of
December 5, 1950, were considered.

Referral/Consult

It is contemplated that the following training would
be given these individuals during a two-weeks' period while in
Washington at the rate of ten hours per day, six days per week:

RECORDED - 66

APR 9 1951

Total Hours

1. Radio training, codes, ciphers and
practice - 6 hours per day. (USAF)

- 2.

Indoctrination of agents and
administrative procedures.

MAILED 10
APR 6 1951

COMM - FBI

ESS:hke/ke

65 APR 16 1951

Total Hours

--	--

3. FBI Training:

Russian system of detection and how to effect counter-measures.	3
Secret writing, codes, etc.	8
Deceptive cover and security.	6
Selection and training of Sub-Agents and informants.	3
Disarming methods	3

Referral/Consult

It is contemplated that the above schedule should be flexible enough to adapt to the background and capabilities of the individuals involved. It is also contemplated that each individual will be available to the Bureau for training at the rate of four hours per day for one week of his two-weeks' stay in the Washington area.

In connection with your suggestion for basic training in the use of a Russian dictionary, it has been determined that,

due to the difficulty of the language and the fact that invasion forces in Alaska would probably be made up of groups from the Siberian area who do not necessarily speak Russian, it is more feasible to substitute a course in the marking and identification of Soviet equipment, uniforms, etc.

Inasmuch as it is contemplated that a considerable number of Stay-behind Agents who are developed will be pulled out of Alaska in the event of an invasion to be used at a later date for special assignments in Alaska, it is considered necessary that training in parachute jumping be given to as many as possible of those individuals who will be sent back into Alaska.

The Bureau has been advised that

Your specific recommendations are desired relative to the financial aspects involved during the training phase of this program. It should be discreetly determined as to what type of short-term life and accident insurance is available in Alaska and the approximate cost involved. You should bear in mind that the maximum period of training for the Stay-behind Agents will not exceed six weeks in duration. Your comments are desired relative to the security involved in securing the insurance policies, that is, whether consideration should be given to taking out these policies in the United States or in Alaska. You should be most circumspect in making these inquiries and under no circumstances should you recommend a specific insurance company in subsequent contacts to the Stay-behind Agent.

It is likewise desired that you consider the question of remuneration and personal expenses involved for the individual Stay-behind Agent while he is receiving training. It is believed that no hard and fast rule can be set up in this regard but will depend upon the financial condition, family responsibilities, etc., of the individual involved. Transportation costs from residence in Alaska to the airport (USAF-Anchorage) and return, salary in lieu of customary earnings, personal expenses and insurance costs should be included in your study of this problem.

Referral/Consult

Advise the Bureau immediately of your observations, suggestions, and recommendations concerning the financial arrangements which you feel should be effected in this matter.

In the meantime, the administrative case files of the recommended Stay-behind Agents should be carefully reviewed to determine which individuals should first receive the necessary training, which ones will agree to come to the U. S. to receive same and which ones will be agreeable to receiving the parachute jump training. All factors should be carefully considered in this connection, especially the age, physical condition, and educational background of the individual. It is suggested in this regard that a representative number of Stay-behind Agents who are easily accessible be contacted relative to the proposed training program and efforts be made to determine their reactions relative to the proposed training in the U. S. and when they might possibly be available to receive the training. You should thereafter advise the Bureau immediately whether arrangements can be perfected by you with the Stay-behind Agents, whereby these individuals can proceed to Washington at the rate of two per week, traveling separately, beginning on or about April 25, 1951.

It is recalled that in your letter to the Bureau dated 2-7-51, information was set forth reflecting that military authorities in Alaska had informed you that the strategic areas in Alaska are Anchorage, Fairbanks, Seward, McGrath, Galena and Nome.

You are instructed to re-examine the problem of coverage in line with the recently defined strategic areas and submit your observations and recommendations to the Bureau as to whether the Stay-behind Agent coverage in the vicinities of the above named localities is adequate.

Referral/Consult

You should also prepare a list of the Stay-behind Agents who have been recommended by the Anchorage Office, contacted and agreed to act in connection with this program, said list being broken down geographically, and thereafter, discuss [redacted] the question of adequacy of coverage. The Bureau should be furnished with a copy of the list prepared in this regard [redacted] should be informed of the number of Stay-behind Agents developed to date in the strategic areas and apprised of their general qualifications. It will not be necessary to inform [redacted] concerning the identities of the individuals involved at this time; however, you should immediately inform the Bureau of your views as to when their identities should be made known to [redacted]

It is imperative that you give this matter immediate attention. A reply to this communication should reach the Bureau within six days of its receipt in the Anchorage Office, and should include your views, observations and recommendations in connection with the training program which is outlined herein.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 4/7/51

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

1-813

b6
b7C

Rebulet to Anchorage 4/4/51 entitled "Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay Behind Agent Program).
Bureau File 65-59264.

It was determined the correct name of this individual was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] However the case in this office has been closed. Upon receipt of reliable information that he [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and was also hospitalized
in [REDACTED] for [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

In addition it was reported he was extremely talkative, likes to impress people with his importance by talking, and it was suggested that he not be contacted regarding any confidential matter for this reason.

In view of this information no further consideration should be afforded this individual under this program.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12BTS/SC

34225/

66-396
SSP:HOW

RECORDED - 49

INDEXED - 49

165-59264-94
APR 11 1951
15
5-120-1116HANDLED BY
7-116

60 APR 18 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RADIOGRAM

(e)(u) (u)
(APRIL 6, 1951)

(u) (u)
(CIPHER PAD CODE)

SAC, ANCHORAGE

DEFERRED

(e)(u)
STAGE. REURAD (APRIL FIVE) LAST. ADVISE DATES REPORTS AND
IDENTITIES SPECIAL AGENTS SUBMITTING SAME ON [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
SEE BUDDTS (MARCH TWENTY SIX) LAST RE [REDACTED]

SURAD.

HOOVER

RECORDED - 66
WEB:gem

65-59264-94

✓ C. B. Downing
D

CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BJS/1M
ON 6-19-2010

00-11642107
20 20 20 20 20
061913.
cl. 7/10/51
2050-2120 (u)

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

(e)(u)
Bureau Radio (4-6-51) 4:58 P.M. JSS

APR 6 1 33 PM '51
RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
(u)

6/22/94
Classified by SP3-BJS/1M
Declassify on: OADR 3/4/25/

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

(u) (u)
65-59264-1818

C. B. S.
CHS

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b7C

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont ☒ _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

7/1/99
 CLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/HW
 DECLASSIFY ON: 1
 PER OGA letter dtd 7/20/98 #342251

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(4-5-51)

NR 052016

7:15 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

6/22/94
 SP12 BTSSC

3/22/95

Referral/Consult

RE STAGE STATUS REPORT. SIXTY-SEVEN PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS REGARDING THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. LETTER DATED (SECOND) INSTANT WENT FORWARD OUTLINING PROGRAM OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REQUESTED BUREAU EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS ON WHOM PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED SO THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. [REDACTED]

RECEIVED: (4-5-51) (u) 7:53 PM

GLA

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b7c

SP3-BTJ/M

per OGA LETTER 7/20/98 #00-1164

RECORDED - 66

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: April 7, 1951

SUBJECT:
ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

b6
b7C

Rebulet to Anchorage dated April 4, 1951 entitled Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay Behind Agent Program). Bureau File 65-59264.

The case in this office has been closed and no further consideration may be given to as he is now deceased.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 BTJ/80

342251
SP12 BTJ/80

66-407
SSP:HCT

RECORDED - 49

INDEXED - 49

1/5- 174 / -95
APR 11 195115
S-120-143

APR 18 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 4/7/51

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
 ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

b6
 b7C

Rebulet to Anchorage dated April 4, 1951 entitled Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay Behind Agent Program). Bureau File 65-59264.

The case in this matter has been closed by the Anchorage Office because of information received that [REDACTED] is the brother to [REDACTED] who is associated with [REDACTED] Anchorage File 87-185, who appears to be connected with a narcotics traffic in Fairbanks and is a known prostitute.

b6
 b7C

In view of this information no further consideration should be afforded [REDACTED] under the instant program.

b6
 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 BTJ/SJS

342251

66-384
 SSP:HCW

RECORDED - 49
 INDEXED - 49

65-57214-96
 APR 11 1951
 1730

173
 APR 18 1951

98

SAC, Anchorage

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

RECORDED - 19

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF EVACUATION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Aurlet 4-11-51.

342251
SP12B TS 15C
4/22/94

The suggestions and observations submitted in referenced letter have been reviewed, and based upon an analysis thereof, the following instructions are being issued:

1. The individuals residing in the strategic areas of Nome, Fairbanks and Seward, who have been recommended by the Anchorage office as Stay-behind Agents for inclusion in this program, should be recontacted. The proposed training program should be briefly outlined and efforts made to determine when these persons will be available to receive training in the United States. It should be determined whether they will agree to participating in the parachute jump training.

The financial aspects of instant program should be explored. Although no specific offer, as such, should be made to these agents, it is suggested that their reaction be obtained concerning the following financial arrangements:

- A. Remuneration of \$150.00 per week basic pay plus \$4.00 per diem for incidental expenses, if no jump training taken. This would include a period of approximately two weeks in Washington, D. C., plus air travel time from Alaska to the U. S. and return.
- B. If participating in jump training, same as above for the first two weeks in Washington, D. C.

\$175.00 per week basic pay, plus same per diem as above, for the approximate 2-1/2 weeks during the jump training course.

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
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 Belmont _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Egan _____
 Gurnea _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____

63 MAY 11 1951

WFB:bjw

Referral/Consult

2. The same action as set forth above should be taken in connection with the Stay-behind Agents in Galena and McGrath, Alaska, as soon as the initial contacts have been made with these individuals.
3. Forward to the Bureau prior to May 10, 1961, a list of the reports on the Stay-behind Agents which you propose to disseminate to [redacted].
[redacted] The identical dissemination will be made to [redacted]. You should personally deliver copies of the pertinent reports to [redacted] on the latter date. It is suggested in this regard that you discreetly inform [redacted] of the necessity of maintaining these reports in a safe and secure place, and that the contents of the reports be made available only to limited personnel in [redacted] which he may designate.
4. Continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents. It is not believed that a decision can be reached at this time as to whether the coverage is adequate, but will depend upon the number of agents already developed who will agree to come to the United States for training. It is quite possible that during the training some of these individuals will decline to act, either because of fear, or personal reasons. Although every effort must be made to keep this number to the minimum, it is believed such a possibility exists which would, therefore, perceptibly affect the adequacy of coverage.

For your information, arrangements are being made to photograph and fingerprint all trainees at the Bureau. The Anchorage office will be advised of the results of fingerprint checks and will be provided with copies of the photographs of the agents.

With reference to your suggestion that the Bureau consider the possibility of contacting the superiors of potential Stay-behind Agents in Government service, or in private industry, in order that requests can be made for

them to receive a leave of absence to attend training school, this is to advise that the Bureau recognizes the merit of your suggestion, however, it is believed that such procedure would possibly jeopardize the security of instant program. As you are aware, the Bureau has proceeded with this matter on the theory that the fewer people who are cognizant of the project, the better the chances are to maintain the development of this program confidential and keep the operation secure. The action suggested by you in this regard is not being approved. In the event one of the individuals selected cannot come to the U. S. for training without securing some type of clearance from his superior, the Bureau would only consider such action under unusual circumstances and in case the services of the individual are essential for the implementation of the program. Under no circumstances should a Stay-behind Agent be informed that the Bureau could intercede with his employer to secure such a desired clearance.

In the future, in submitting information reflecting contact with a Stay-behind Agent, the Bureau should be advised of the results thereof by a separate communication on every Stay-behind Agent so that all pertinent data relative to the individual will be contained in his administrative file. Information set forth in referenced letter, specifically pages 2, 3 and 4, which reflects contacts with the seven individuals mentioned therein, should be incorporated in the appropriate case files maintained in the Anchorage office. The same action is being taken at the Bureau.

You should continue to give all phases of this program your personal attention and keep the Bureau advised of all developments.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: April 11, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(65-59264)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP1207818C
ON 6/22/94
342251

Rebulet April 6, 1951.

There is set out hereinafter the information requested in referenced letter and observations concerning the training program.

It is believed that training the Agents in Washington and singly has a distinct advantage from a security angle, although it is quite possible that it will be a more expensive proposition.

With reference to caching, this office has advised the Bureau in Anchorage letter dated February 13, 1951, that we are presently compiling a dossier with reference to this operation. It will be accelerated and submitted to the Bureau at the earliest possible moment.

With reference to the short term insurance policy which the Bureau suggested in favor of each potential agent who goes into Washington for training, contact was had here with [redacted] Life and Accident and Health Department, Edward D. Corley Agency for the Continental Casualty Company and Continental Assurance Company in Anchorage. He was not, of course, advised in any way of the particulars of this program but was merely asked concerning short term insurance. He stated that it could, of course, be written but that his company as well as any other insurance company, would have to know the names of the insured, the age of the insured, as well as the risk involved. He said that his company would have to know if the insurance written was a program involving unusual risks or unusual circumstances. He said that insurance policies could be written on a confidential basis, in which event they could all be handled through one person. He continued that the shortest standard term insurance presently written by his company (and probably by other companies) is 5 years. The price of such insurance would, of course, depend on the risks involved and the age of the insured. It is suggested that insurance such as that contemplated by the Bureau, which will be of a confidential nature, could be best handled by a company in the States and probably in Washington, D. C.

COPIES DESTROYED

With regard to expenses during training, all potential Stay Behind Agents in the Anchorage area who were available were contacted and information obtained which would reflect on the cost of their training to the Government. These data are as follows:

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

JHW:MMA
65-298
Enclosure

RECORDED - 108

INDEXED - 108

APR 14 1951

15

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-59264

Letter to the Director, FBI
April 11, 1951

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

1 - FRANK B. MOORE, 621 15th Street, Anchorage

He advised that he is presently making a little over \$600 a month for a 6 day week, which days consist of 8 to 10 hours. He continued that he could go to Washington for training school consisting of 6 weeks at any time. He said that his family consists of a wife only. He owns his home here and is making payments on it. Hence, he felt that he should receive as much money for the time away from his job as he would earn if he were working. He has at the present time a \$15,000 life insurance policy. He stated that he would take parachute jump training if necessary. It is noted that he was born March 30, 1908, being 43 years of age. In addition to the remuneration noted above, he stated that he felt he should get approximately \$3 or \$4 daily for incidental expense money.

2 - [REDACTED] Anchorage

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b7C

Upon inquiry he stated that his only dependent was a wife. He said he would participate in parachute jump training if the same were included in the training program. He stated that his present income is approximately \$1000 per month. He is the proprietor and only attendant at his [REDACTED] and if he were called away from it he would have to [REDACTED] or get his wife to attend it while he was gone. If he could do this, he continued, she would have to obtain a leave of absence from her job with [REDACTED] to operate [REDACTED]. With reference to the date on which he could go to Washington, he said he could go at any time.

3 - [REDACTED] Anchorage

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] upon contact stated that his dependents are a wife and one child. He said that he could go to Washington at any time for training if he received two weeks notice. He said that he was willing to take parachute jump training but it is noted that he has a bad ankle. This probably would prevent him from participating in this training. With reference to expenses, he said that it would take \$700 per month to cover his expenses in Anchorage and his salary loss from his job as manager of [REDACTED]

4 - [REDACTED] Anchorage

[REDACTED] informed that his income as proprietor of [REDACTED] is approximately \$10,000 per year. He said his family responsibilities are a wife and 3 children. He continued that he could go to Washington at any

b6
b7C

Letter to the Director, FBI
April 11, 1951
P & C

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

time but that his expenses would vary depending upon the time of year he went. He said if he went during June, July, August or September, which he would do if the request was urgent, he would lose an income of approximately \$1500 per month. He said that if he went during the month of October he would lose an income of approximately \$500 to \$750 per month. He said that if he went during the months of December, January and other winter months he would lose an income of approximately only \$300 per month. However, as stated above, he said that he would go at any time he was called, with the loss of income quoted. [redacted] stated that he presently has a \$12,000 life insurance policy and a \$1200 life insurance policy as well as a \$5000 and a \$10,000 aviation accident policy, the \$10,000 amount to be paid if he is killed in a commercial aircraft. [redacted] also advised that he felt that a \$10,000 insurance policy should be taken out on his life if he travels by military plane. With reference to parachute jump training, [redacted] said that he would take such training but that if he has a choice he would not participate in this phase.

b6
b7C

5 - [redacted]

[redacted] advised that his income at present is approximately \$8000 to \$10,000. His family consists of a wife and 2 children who would stay here during the training period. He said he felt his personal incidental expenses would be \$3 to \$5 daily but would accept any amount which the Government felt to be fair. With reference to the date of his training, he said that he had [redacted] beginning May 15 which would last approximately two weeks and would gross him approximately \$1800. He did not desire to go during that period. It is noted the bear season is over June 20, after which he has [redacted] scheduled. With reference to parachute jump training, he said that he would jump on occasion if absolutely necessary but at this time does not desire any such training. It is noted he is employed by [redacted] and if he went into Washington for training he would either have to obtain a leave of absence without pay, in which event he would want to be paid the amount of money lost, or obtain paid leave. It is noted that he will use most of his annual leave [redacted] hence, he probably will have to obtain leave without pay.

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b7C

6 - [redacted] Anchorage

It is noted he has opened [redacted] in Anchorage on [redacted] and does not know what his income will be. However, he said that during 1950 he made approximately \$6500. He said that he expected to make more than

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b7C

Letter to the Director, FBI
April 11, 1951
~~P a C~~

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

this [redacted] He said that he would rather not go into Washington for training until he had gotten his [redacted] business on its feet and if he had a choice would wait till the latter part of 1951. His dependents are a wife and one child who would stay in Anchorage while he was in training. He stated that in addition to receiving the amount of money he would lose by being away from his business, he felt he should have approximately \$3 a day for incidental expenses. He stated he did not desire to participate in the parachute jump training.

b6
b7C

7 - [redacted]

[redacted] stated that his income at present is approximately [redacted] per year. He has a [redacted] to [redacted]

[redacted] It is noted that most of his income is made between April and November. He said he felt he could go to Washington for a period of training in October or November gratis. Although he could go during this period, it was pointed out by him that during the time he was away he could have earned approximately [redacted] a week here. With reference to parachute jump training, [redacted] commented that he was patriotic enough to jump on occasion if necessary but he did not desire such training.

b6
b7C

By way of observation concerning the above comments of the individuals contacted, it is noted that the expenses would be considerable. From these contacts, it could be noted in the case of most of the potential Stay Behind Agents that their income is derived mainly during the months between April and November of each year. The cost to the Government in replacing their incomes between November and April would be very materially decreased if the training could be had at that time.

With reference to those agents who should be the first to go, it is believed that they should be chosen for the training that they would receive in the most important phases, namely, those who would operate radios and receive radio training should be among the first. It is believed that those of sufficient youth and vigorous health should be chosen among the first. Also, of necessity, those who can get away from their businesses or jobs will necessarily have to be chosen at the time when they can most expeditiously go.

With reference to the [redacted]

Letter to the Director, FBI

April 11, 1951

P & C

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

5x8
Cards
Being
retained
in Room
1539
ms.

With reference to the Bureau's direction that a list of the agents already recommended be compiled geographically and alphabetically, there are being transmitted herewith 5 x 8 cards on each of the 67 agents recommended to date. A copy of each of these cards has been maintained here for current use. As each additional agent is recommended and closing reports submitted to the Bureau, cards will be made up similar to those enclosed and forwarded for inclusion in the Bureau's file. It is suggested that the Bureau official supervising this program may desire to maintain these cards for ready reference.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] were informed during the conference on April 10, 1951, of the number of agents we have developed in each strategic area and their general qualifications but identities of the same were not divulged to them.

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the identities of the agents who have been recommended be given to [redacted] at the same time they are given to [redacted] and that copies of the reports compiled here be given to [redacted] at that time. It is also recommended that this be done immediately.

By way of general observation concerning the training phase of this program, the following is noted:

1 - As observed above, in the polling of a cross section of the potential agents it is noted that the cost of the training would be very materially decreased if it were given during the winter months, inasmuch as is the case of most persons in the territory of Alaska, the potential agents are receiving most of their income during the months between April 1 and November 1 of each year.

Letter to the Director, FBI

April 11, 1951

~~P & C~~

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)


2 - Inspector T. E. NAUGHTEN was in attendance at the conference on April 10, 1951, as was noted above, and has thoroughly reviewed the Stay Behind Agent Program in the Anchorage Office.

3 - It is recommended that photographs and fingerprints be obtained from each trainee at the time he arrives in Washington for training.

4 - It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to consider the possibility of contacting the superiors of potential Stay Behind Agents in Government service or in private industry in order that they can receive a leave of absence in which to attend training school.

ENCLOSURE TO THE BUREAU

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF HOSTILITIES
(SAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)




UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
ALASKA
COMPILED FROM ALL AUTHENTIC SOURCES
SCALE 1:5,000,000
1 INCH=APPROXIMATELY 80 MILES
ALASKA MAP A EDITION OF 1947



STRATEGIC AREAS

RED DOT-AGENT RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING
REPORT SUBMITTED.
BLUE DOT-INTERVIEW AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED
FOR HANDLING
GREEN DOT-PRELIMINARY REPORT SUBMITTED AND
AWAITING BUREAU AUTHORITY TO
INTERVIEW.



Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(4-6-51) (u)

NR 070105

9:51 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

STAGE. REFERENCE YOUR RADIOGRAM (APRIL 6) FOLLOWING LISTS
 TITLES. AGENT AND DATES OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY THIS OFFICE:

[REDACTED] DATED (APRIL 3) LAST;

DATED (APRIL 2)

DATED (APRIL 2) LAST;

DATED (APRIL 2) LAST; AND

DATED (APRIL 2) LAST; (u)

ALL REPORTS BY SPECIAL AGENT EDWARD A. PLEVACK.

RECEIVED

(4-6-51) (u)

10:01 PM LH

(UNDERLINED PORTION IS ACTUAL DECODE.) (u)

Classified by SP3 BT/80
 Declassify on: OADR 342251

RECORDED BY SP3-BIS/SM
 ON 6-14-2000

RECORDED - 50

00-1164

EX-86

COPIES DESTROYED
 85 NOV 23 1960

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

66 APR 24 1951 (u)

65-59264

$$(U)$$

March 28, 1951

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE IN EVENT OF WAR

(U)

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~~6/22/94
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F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (e) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(4-12-51) (e) (u) NR 122017

5:37 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. SIXTY-EIGHT PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY-BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS RE THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU.

AND LETTER COVERING SAME SUBMITTED (APRIL 11TH.) (e) (u)

RECEIVED: (4-12-51) (e) (u) 5:45 PM

GLA

Referral/Consult

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-14-2000 BY SP3-BTS/SM~~

~~6-12-194
 SP3-BTS/SM
 342251~~

SP3-BTS/SM
 6-14-2000

RECORDED - 118
 00-1164

APR 14 1951 (e) (u) - 101
 5-11-51

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (e) (u)

(50 APR 24 1951) (e) (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 11, 1951

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 BJS/86

Tolson	✓
Ladd	✓
Clegg	
Glavin	
Nichols	✓
Rosen	
Tracy	
Harbo	
Belmont	
Mohr	
Tele. Room	
Nease	
Gandy	

PURPOSE:

(1) To advise that it is estimated approximately 50 individuals in Alaska will be selected to serve as Stay-behind Agents in the event that Territory is invaded; (2) to inform that the question of adequacy of coverage this regard in Alaska has not been definitely resolved and is presently being examined by the SAC at Anchorage [redacted] Referral/Consult

BACKGROUND:

You will recall that during the past few months the Anchorage Office has given top priority to the development of individuals in Alaska who will remain there and serve as Stay-behind Agents in the event that Territory might be attacked and occupied by the Russians. By memorandum from V. P. Keay to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated March 31, 1951, a plan for the training of these agents was presented for approval. In connection therewith, you inquired: "Just approximately how many such agents is it planned to have. H."

Referral/Consult

OBSERVATIONS:

As of today, the Anchorage Office has developed 66 persons who are being considered as possible agents. The development of these individuals is continuing until such time as the SAC at Anchorage and [redacted] agree that coverage is adequate and the Bureau concurs in their recommendation. From the group developed, it is estimated that approximately 50 individuals will be selected to serve as Stay-behind Agents and be afforded appropriate training [redacted] by [redacted] FBI.

As you are aware, the [redacted]

By letter dated April 8,

1951, the SAC at Anchorage was instructed to again confer with [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Upon receipt of the results of the conference between FBI [redacted] you will be advised.

ACTION:

RECORDED - 116

Referral/Consult

This is for your information.

WTB:bjs
60 APR 20 1951

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
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Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
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Laughlin _____
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Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(4-19-51)

NR 192022

6:21 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. SEVENTY-TWO PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. FOURTEEN INDIVIDUALS REMAIN ON WHOM PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED AND BUREAU AUTHORITY RECEIVED TO INTERVIEW. THESE ARE ASSIGNED AND EFFORT BEING MADE TO CONTACT THEM. TWO PRELIMINARY REPORTS SUBMITTED AND AWAITING BUREAU AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. RE ANCHORAGE LET 11TH INSTANT PAGE 5 LINE 2. GULKANA SHOULD BE GALENA.

RECEIVED

(4-19-51)

6:27 PM

VAM

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

SP3-BTJ/SM
6-14-2006

00-1164

RECORDED - 50

EX-22

APR 21 1951

HAND
STOP 4/20

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

(7-1-2006 1951) 176 (u)

65-59264

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY

(e)(u)

Tolson _____
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Nichols _____
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Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(4-26-51)

NR 262022

4:23 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. SEVENTY-TWO PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY-BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. TWELVE ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AUTHORIZED AND ATTEMPTS BEING MADE TO HANDLE SAME CERTAIN OF THESE PERSONS UNAVAILABLE AT PRESENT. ONE CASE PENDING AWAITING INVESTIGATION ANOTHER FIELD OFFICE. ONE CASE PENDING AWAITING AUTHORITY OF BUREAU TO INTERVIEW.

RECEIVED: (4-26-51)

4:57 PM

GLA

b6
b7C

SP3-BTJ/jm

6-14-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 34

142
(62 MAY 5 1951)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (e)(u)

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : V. P. KEAY *VPKA*

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

DATE: March 31, 1951

PURPOSE:

To present for approval a plan for the training of individuals to be used as Stay-Behind Agents in Alaska in the event of invasion. To submit for approval a letter to the SAC at Anchorage advising him of the plans for instant training and requesting his comments in connection therewith.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

My memorandum to you dated January 6, 1951, analyzed the suggestions of the SAC at Anchorage for the training of the individuals to be used as Stay-Behind Agents. The memorandum of January 6, 1951, also recommended that it be determined whether

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

Referral/Consult

This matter has been discussed by Special Agent Edward S. Sanders on several occasions with

Attachment

ESS:hke

RECORDED - 134

MAY 4 1951

34

5-Bak

Referral/Consult

It is contemplated that the following training would be given these individuals during a two-weeks' period while in Washington at the rate of ten hours per day, six days per week:

Referral/Consult

Total Hours

Total Hours

3. *FBI Training:*

*Russian system of detection and
how to effect countermeasures.* 3

Secret writing, codes, etc. 8

Deceptive cover and security. 6

*Selection and training of
Sub-Agents and informants.* 3

Disarming methods 3

Referral/Consult

It is contemplated that the above schedule should be flexible enough to adapt to the background and capabilities of the individuals involved. It is also contemplated that each individual will be available to the Bureau for training at the rate of four hours per day for one week of his two-weeks' stay in the Washington area. He will be available to

Inasmuch as it is contemplated that a considerable number of the Stay-Behind Agents who are developed will be pulled out of Alaska in the event of an invasion to be used at a later date for special assignments in Alaska, it is considered necessary that training in parachute jumping be given to as many as possible of those individuals who will be sent back into Alaska. In this connection,

[Redacted]

EXPENSES:

Referral/Consult

As noted above [Redacted]

[Redacted]

It has been suggested that the Bureau pay, as they would on a confidential informant basis, these Stay-Behind Agents while they are receiving their training. The amount of such pay would, of course, be determined on an individual basis and considerations such as the individual's family, loss of income during training, and individual expenses should be considered and recommendations made by the SAC at Anchorage. It has also been suggested that the Bureau pay for a short-term insurance policy on each of the Stay-Behind Agents while he is in training. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

DATE OF INSTITUTION OF TRAINING PROGRAM:

[Redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It appears that the plan outlined herein is feasible and provides a maximum of security with a minimum of expense. It is recommended that the Bureau approve this plan of training for

sent
these individuals and that the attached letter to the SAC in Anchorage advising him of these plans for training be forwarded with instructions that he immediately make available his comments concerning the plan. The attached letter also instructs that the SAC in Anchorage advise whether arrangements can be perfected for these individuals to proceed to Washington at the rate of two per week, traveling separately, beginning on or about April 25, 1951.

ADDENDUM:

Referral/Consult

Subsequent to the preparation of this memorandum, SA Edward S. Sanders again conferred with [redacted]

[redacted] It was suggested [redacted] that since the Stay-behind Agents would be [redacted]

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE
RECOMMENDATION:

April 7, 1951

On April 5, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Quinn Tamm for Mr. Tracy, Mohr, Nease, and Belmont, considered the above program with particular reference to the training listed for the FBI and expense which will be involved in connection with a short-term insurance policy for each Stay-Behind Agent and reimbursement to these Agents for loss of money while they are away from Alaska. The Conference recommended that the Bureau proceed on the basis that we will conduct this training and will meet the necessary expenses of reimbursement and insurance, each to be on an individual basis dependent on the necessary reimbursement to the individual Agent.

AHB:tlc

OK. Just approximately how many such agents is it planned to have - H.

*memo to Director
4-11-51
WS.*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 26, 1951

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-2-94 BY SP12ST/SCTolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

To set forth an analysis of the observations and suggestions of the SAC, Anchorage, relative to developments in instant program.

To submit proposals concerning the financial aspects of the training phase of this project.

To recommend that the Anchorage office be instructed to continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents and to contact agents already developed in the strategic areas of Alaska (except Anchorage) to determine when said individuals will be available for training to be given by [redacted] FBI at Washington, D.C.

Referral/Consult

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

You will recall that V. P. Keay's memorandum to you dated March 31, 1951, set forth for approval a plan for the training of Stay-behind Agents. Summarily, the plan provided that [redacted]

[redacted] FBI would provide the training previously agreed upon by the Bureau. On April 5, 1951, the Executives' Conference considered this phase of the program with particular reference to the training responsibilities of the Bureau and expenses involved in connection with a short-term insurance policy for every Stay-behind Agent and reimbursement to these agents for loss of time and income during the training period. The Conference recommended that the Bureau proceed on the basis that we will conduct this training and will meet the necessary expenses of reimbursement and insurance, each to be on an individual basis. It is noted that the Director made the following comment thereon: "Ok. Just approximately how many such agents is it planned to have. H." (The latter inquiry was answered by Mr. Ladd's memorandum to the Director dated 4-11-51. It was approximated that possibly 50 agents would receive training.)

RECORDED - 53

WTB:bjw

MAY 9 1951

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

62 MAY 18 1951

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R584 NOV 21 1960

By letter dated 4-6-51, the SAC at Anchorage was advised of contemplated plans for instant training and his comments were requested. He was instructed to contact a representative number of individuals recommended by the Anchorage office, who were readily available, to determine their reaction to the proposal of being brought to the U. S. for training; to determine what type of short-term insurance was available which could be secured by these agents to cover their period of training; and, to explore the financial aspects of this undertaking in order to determine what reimbursement would be expected by these agents for loss of time and income during the period of training.

ANALYSIS OF SAC WILLIAMS' (ANCHORAGE) OBSERVATIONS

By letter dated 4-11-51, SAC Williams pointed out as follows:

1. The training^{of}/agents at SOG will have a distinct advantage from a security angle, although it will be a more expensive proposition.
2. A representative of the Continental Casualty Company and Continental Assurance Company in Anchorage stated that short-term insurance could be written, but it would be necessary to know the name of the insured, his age as well as the risk involved; further, that the company would have to know if the insurance written involved unusual risks or unusual circumstances. The shortest term insurance presently written by the company is 5 years.

SAC Williams suggested that the insurance, such as is contemplated by the Bureau which will be of a confidential nature, could be best handled by a company in the U. S., probably in Washington, D. C.

Referral/Consult

Comments:

--

It is contemplated that those agents who will agree to take

the parachute jump training [redacted]

[redacted] This undoubtedly would be considered an "undue risk" or an "unusual circumstance" as far as insurance coverage is concerned. The insurance originally considered was only to cover the risks involved in transporting the agent from Alaska to the U. S., the period of his training, and return trip to Alaska. This means a period of about 3 weeks if jump training is excluded, and 6 weeks if jump training taken.

[redacted]
Supervisor E. S. Sanders, Liaison Section, Security Division, who has been maintaining contact with [redacted]

PROPOSED ACTION (a)

[redacted]
It is further proposed that thereafter, Supervisor Sanders make discreet inquiries of reputable insurance firms in Washington in order to determine what specific coverage can be secured, and the costs involved. Sanders has indicated he has sources from whom the desired information can be obtained.

3. Seven recommended Stay-behind Agents readily available in the vicinity of Anchorage have been recontacted in order to secure their reaction to being brought to the U. S. for training, and efforts made to determine what financial arrangements could possibly be worked out in this regard. These individuals have incomes varying from \$600. to \$2,000. monthly. Besides being reimbursed for possible loss of income, everyone considered he should also receive \$3. to \$5.00 extra per day for incidental expenses. The majority of those contacted indicated they did not desire to participate in the parachute jump training but would do so if they had no choice in the matter.

It was further pointed out that some of these individuals make the most, or at least the larger part, of their income during the summer months, that is, from approximately April to October. It was stated that if these individuals could receive their training later on in the season, the cost to the government would be considerably decreased.

Comments:

It is noted these seven individuals have an average income of about \$935. monthly. Removing the two high-salaried ones, 1 of \$1000. and 1 of \$2,000. monthly, the average income is roughly \$685. monthly. This latter figure amounts to about \$160. weekly. It is not believed that the Bureau should consider reimbursing a \$10,000 or \$25,000. a year man for his loss of time and income. The cost would be prohibitive.

PROPOSED ACTION (b)

It is proposed that the Bureau consider reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents during their training period, as follows:

No jump training

\$150.00 per week basic pay plus \$4.00 per diem for incidental expenses.

If jump training included

Same as above for two weeks training in Washington, D. C., and \$175.00 per week

basic pay (plus same per diem as above) for the approximate 2-1/2 weeks extra during the jump training course.

At first glance this proposed plan of reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents might appear to be excessive. It is pointed out, however, that rates of income in the Territory of Alaska are much higher than they are in the United States. The basic proposal of remuneration being considered is to reimburse these individuals for loss of income and time while undergoing training. It is observed that the Bureau has taken into consideration the cost of living in Alaska with Bureau personnel assigned there, and that they receive a 25% differential in cost of living which is in addition to their base pay. Bearing these factors in mind, and considering that these Stay-behind Agents are being selected and trained to carry out a very important and dangerous assignment, in the event of invasion, which may even effect the security of the United States, it is not believed that the rates of pay suggested are excessive.

It is further proposed that the SAC at Anchorage be instructed to bear the above proposed payment plan in mind when recontacting the Stay-behind Agents to work out the training schedule.

4.

Referral/Consult

Comments:

It is not believed that the Bureau can completely concur in SAC Williams' recommendation that coverage is adequate in spite of the fact that, according to Anchorage radiogram 4-19-51, 72 persons have been recommended as Stay-behind Agents. The problems involved are (1) How many who have agreed to act will agree to coming to the U. S. for training purposes?; and, of those agreeing to come, How many will take the parachute jump training? Although

a large number has agreed to act, if only a representative number can be prevailed upon to take the necessary training, our coverage will decline perceptibly. In view of this, consideration should be given to continuing the development of potential Stay-behind Agents.

PROPOSED ACTION (c)

It is proposed that the SAC at Anchorage be instructed to continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents until such time as it can be more definitely determined if coverage is adequate.

5. The Anchorage office has suggested that the Stay-behind Agents be photographed and fingerprinted during the time they are in Washington, D. C.

Comment:

It is believed this is a sound suggestion.

PROPOSED ACTION (d)

It is proposed that Mr. R. C. Renneberger, Mechanical Section, Administrative Division, effect arrangements so that these agents can be photographed at the Bureau during their course of training. Six copies of each photograph will suffice.

*Noted
RJR*

It is also proposed that the Identification Division handle the mechanics involved in fingerprinting the Stay-behind Agents. It is suggested that the prints be searched through the criminal files and the Espionage Section, Security Division, be informed of the results of the search.

6. The Anchorage office has suggested that the Bureau may desire to consider the possibility of contacting the superiors of potential Stay-behind Agents in Government service or in private industry in order to request that their superiors permit them to receive a leave of absence in which to attend training school.

Comment:

Although this suggestion has considerable merit, it would possibly cause a soft-spot in the general security of the entire program. We have proceeded on the theory that the fewer people who are advised about this program, the better the chances are to maintain the project in confidence and keep the operation secure.

PROPOSED ACTION (e)

It is proposed that the Anchorage office be advised that this action is not being approved as a general procedure, but that in the event the individual selected cannot come to the U. S. for training without securing some type of clearance from his superior, that in unusual circumstances, the Bureau will consider a specific request of this nature if the SAC at Anchorage so recommends.

7. The SAC at Anchorage has suggested that the identities of the Stay-behind Agents who have been recommended be given to [redacted]

[redacted] and that copies of reports prepared on the Stay-behind Agents in Alaska be given to [redacted] at that time. He further recommended that this be done immediately.

PROPOSED ACTION (f)

It is proposed that the SAC, Anchorage, be instructed to disseminate copies of reports prepared in these cases to [redacted] further, that he submit to the Bureau prior to May 10, 1951, a list of the reports to be disseminated, and that identical dissemination be effected at SOG and in Anchorage on May 15, 1951.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that proposal (a) be approved for discussion with [redacted]

It is further recommended that [redacted] be advised [redacted] of the reaction concerning the proposed training on the part of the Stay-behind Agents in the Anchorage area as set forth above under background. It should be


pointed out [] that the Anchorage office is presently recontacting all the remaining individuals who have been recommended for use by the Anchorage office in an effort to determine their reaction to being brought to the United States; and that we are now in the process of determining by what dates the agents can arrange their personal and business affairs in order to be available for the scheduled training. It should, therefore, be brought to the attention of [] that the [] FBI [] training program will of necessity have to be temporarily delayed until definite commitments can be obtained from the Stay-behind Agents as to their availability.

It is recommended that proposal (b) be approved only as a basis for consideration by the SAC at Anchorage in making contact with the selected Stay-behind Agents to determine their reaction to being brought to the U. S. for training.

It is recommended that proposals (c), (e) and (f) be approved and that ~~the~~ Anchorage be advised accordingly.

It is recommended that proposal (d) be approved for handling at the Bureau and that this memorandum be routed to the Administrative Division for the attention of Mr. Renneberger, and to the Identification Division, for their information at this time.

If you approve of this action, the attached letter of instructions embodying the above will be forwarded to the Anchorage office.

A handwritten signature, possibly "J. Edgar Hoover", is written over a diagonal line. Below the line are the initials "V. S.".

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: May 4, 1951

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: ~~PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE~~
~~IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION~~
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Nease ✓
Gandy ✓

The attached memorandum sets forth recent developments in connection with the Stay-behind Agent Program in Alaska, the background of which is familiar to you, and suggests proposals for further action re training and coverage.

The following recommendations are made therein:

1. That [redacted] be contacted and requested to:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 BTR

Referral/Consult

2. That [redacted] of the reaction concerning the proposed training on the part of the Stay-behind Agents in the Anchorage area and it should be pointed out [redacted] that the Anchorage office is presently recontacting, all the remaining individuals who have been recommended for use by the Anchorage office in an effort to determine their reaction to being brought to the United States; further, that we are now in the process of determining by what dates the agents can arrange their personal and

Referral/Consult

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R584 NOV 21 1960

Attachment

JTB:mrc:jef

RECORDED - 53
INDEXED - 53
MAY 9 1951
STOP DESK

165-59264-107
MAY 9 1951

Referral/Consult

business affairs in order to be available for the scheduled training. That it be brought to [] attention that the [] FBI [] training program will of necessity have to be temporarily delayed until definite commitments can be obtained from the Stay-behind Agents as to their availability.

3. That Supervisor E. S. Sanders, Liaison Section, Security Division, make discreet inquiries of reputable insurance firms in Washington in order to determine what specific coverage can be secured, and the costs involved. (Sanders has indicated he has sources from whom the desired information can be obtained.)
4. That the Bureau consider reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents during their training period at the rate of \$150. per week for those agents not taking jump training, plus \$4. per diem; and \$175. per week for those agents taking jump training, plus \$4. per diem.
5. That Stay-behind Agents be photographed and fingerprinted during the period of their training in Washington, D. C.
6. That the SAC at Anchorage be instructed to continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents until such time as it can be more definitely determined if coverage is adequate.
7. That the Anchorage office be instructed to disseminate copies of the investigative reports on Stay-behind Agents to [] on May 15, 1951, and that identical dissemination be made at SOG.
8. That the Anchorage office be advised that the Bureau does not approve their suggestion to obtain clearance from employers of Stay-behind Agents so they can get leaves of absence to come to Washington for training; further, that the Bureau would consider taking such action only in unusual circumstances where the individual's services would be essential for the implementation of this program.
9. That the attached letter of instructions embodying the above be forwarded to Anchorage.

Referral/Consult

ghy

15

Send this Bureau called 1 1/2 A M AT

6/22/64
342251

JULY 16 7 30 PM '64 (5)

RECEIVED READING ROOM

FBI

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

424

cc - 62-93603

(NR 162352)
(u)
00-1164
6-14-2000
SP3-BTS/m

RECORDED - 50
65-59264
108

STAGE. RETURNED LAST NIGHT LAST. ADVISE DATE PERTINENT REPORTS AND THOSE
COVERING INTERVIEWS ARE DISSEMINATED TO [redacted] DISSEMINATION BEING
MADE THIS WEEK [redacted] ALL REMAINS LISTED UNDER. AFTER SECURING
BUREAU AUTHORIZATION AMOUNT TO BE PAID AGENT, BUREAU ARRANGEMENTS PAY AGENT
IN ALASKA PREFERABLY UPON COMPLETION OF TRAINING. WHERE FINANCIAL STATUS
AGENTS REQUIRES ADVANCES YOU SHOULD SECURE BUREAU APPROVAL. HANDLED BY
BUREAU CLERK. BUREAU IMMEDIATELY REQUESTED NECESSARY INCREASE IN FINANCIAL
FUND ADVANCE FROM EXHIBITS. S. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND BUREAU CLERK
FUNDS AVAILABLE TO HIM TO PAY TRAVEL EXPENSES SO ARRANGEMENTS RE TRAINING
CAN BE COORDINATED WITH [redacted] BUREAU ON EVERY AGENT AS RECOMMENDED PERTAINING
TRAINING WHEN AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING, IS TAKING OVER TRAINING AND FINANCIAL
ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED INCLUDING YOUR RECOMMENDATION NO SALE. IN ALASKA
TRAINING AGENTS BEGIN SOON AS POSSIBLE AND SCHEDULE ARRANGED. RETURNED (u)
RETURNED LAST NIGHT LAST. BUREAU REQUESTED NECESSARY INCREASE IN FINANCIAL
TRAINING AND AGENTS FOR SINS. HE CAN BE ASSIGNED TRAINING SINS (u)
WITH NEXT IS NOT ALASKA HAS FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HIS TRAINING EXPENSES. HOWEVER

EXHIBIT PAD CODE
DEFERRED
MAY 16, 1964 (u)
SAC, ALASKA
RADIOGRAM

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: May 8, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN EVENT
OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/22/94 BY SPURTS/SC

ReBulet May 4, 1951, page 2, numeral 3.

Referral/Consult

There are transmitted herewith two copies of a list of Stay-behind agents who have been recommended for inclusion in this program and on whom closing reports have been submitted. These reports are the ones that should be disseminated on May 15, 1951.

Referral/Consult



With reference to the delivery of the reports it is noted that the closing reports contain almost all information concerning the proposed stay-behind agent and the same was obtained from him by interview. It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to deliver the closing report only inasmuch as the data contained therein is more likely to be accurate and the same is sufficient for their purposes.

Referral/Consult

With reference to page 1 of Bureau letter dated May 4, 1951, steps have been taken here to contact all recommended potential stay-behind agents to obtain from them the dates on which they can attend training; whether or not they will participate in the parachute jump training; and whether or not the proposed remuneration or some part thereof is sufficient. Likewise, these questions will be put to all proposed stay-behind agents who are interviewed in the future. The contacts with all proposed stay-behind agents to obtain this information will be given priority here, completed immediately, and passed on to the Bureau with no delay whatsoever.

Encl.

65-298
 JHW:vf

EX-121

RECORDED - 11565-157264
 HANDLED BY
 STON BUSH
 MAY 11 1951
 15
 EX-121

COPIES DESTROYED

R584 NOV 21 1961

9. Am
 5-16-51
 W3

Bakel

AN 65-298

In this regard it should be noted, however, that some of these persons will be hard to locate in view of the fact that they will be on construction jobs far into the interior or will be engaged in fishing in the Bristol Bay area.

Referral/Consult

With reference to the training of these individuals. [redacted]

[redacted]

(2) [redacted] It is also requested that this office be advised as to the manner and time that the proposed agent's remuneration or training will be paid in order that questions concerning this may be answered. In this respect it is suggested that a portion of it be made upon his arrival at Washington and the remainder paid upon his departure from Washington.

already read (A memorandum concerning caching is presently in typing and)
(will be submitted to the Bureau immediately upon its completion.)

This matter will continue to receive priority in this office and the Bureau kept advised of all developments.

STAY BEHIND AGENTS CONCERNING WHOM REPORTS WILL BE
DISSEMINATED AS OF 5-15-51.

NameBufileanchorage File

62-93581
 62-93600
 62-93639

66-336
 66-395
 66-408 —
 66-430

62-93523
 62-93481
 62-93602
 62-93857
 62-93482
 62-93646
 62-93501
 62-93586
 62-93636
 62-93879
 62-93992

66-393
 66-420
 66-368
 66-435
 66-313
 66-405
 66-421
 66-418
 66-404
 66-446
 66-415

DANICH, JOE

*Bu - 62-93581
 62-93581
 Bu - 62-93585
 62-93585*

62-93483
 62-93384
 62-93524
 62-93498
 62-93635
 62-93634
 62-93597
 77-31169
 62-93858
 62-93859
 62-93631
 62-93630
 62-93628
 62-93867
 62-93870
 62-93526

b6
 b7C

66-340
 66-344
 66-316
 66-334
 66-332
 66-314
 66-331
 66-410
 66-308
 66-309
 66-429
 66-428
 66-390
 66-389
 66-327
 66-437
 66-438
 66-324

62-93626
 62-93625
 62-93624
 62-93496
 62-93623
 62-93881
 62-93495
 62-93647

66-343
 66-360
 66-411
 66-387
 66-311
 66-363
 66-445
 66-318
 66-373
 66-345
 66-385
 66-372

MCORE, FRANK BERTON

62-93622
 62-93621

*on 62-93621
 on 61-393*

ENCLOSURE

Name

Bufile

Anchorage File



62-93565
62-93868
62-93517
62-93855
62-93619
62-93860
62-93648

66-348
66-439
66-323
66-349
66-371
66-431
66-365
66-342

RO. IG. DR. HOWARD GLENFLORE

62-93489

66-312

SHELTON. DR. JOSEPH HARRISON, M.D.

62-93494

66-322

SILS. FOSTER RAYMOND

62-93518

66-321

62-93603

66-366

62-93877

b6

66-443

62-93617

b7C

66-367

62-93861

66-432

62-93869

66-442

62-93480

66-353

62-93670

66-354

62-93520

66-357

62-93994

66-417

62-93613

66-377

62-93522

66-310

62-93568

66-358

62-93672

66-369

62-93863

66-375

62-93643

66-374

77-44306

66-315

62-93644

66-359

62-94204
62-460
62-93491
62-379

62-94003

66-402

SAC, Anchorage

May 7, 1951

Director, FBI

ADMINISTRATIVE-SBA PROGRAM

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Rebulet 1-11-51 granting authority to contact [redacted] for the purpose of developing him as a Stay-behind Agent, and Bulet 4-4-51 entitled "Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion" wherein you were instructed to expedite this contact and submit a report reflecting the results of this phase of the investigation.

Submit an explanation to the Bureau by return mail as to why this matter has not been handled promptly, and advise when a report may be expected at the Bureau.

As you are aware, it is essential that the recruiting phases of the Stay-behind Agent Program receive prompt and vigorous attention. You are again instructed to impress this fact upon the Special Agents engaged in the handling of instant program in Alaska and afford the supervision of same your personal attention.

62-93517

cc 65-59264

WTB:vas

cc Administrative Division

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nlegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Clegg _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: May 8, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (Stay-behind Agent Program)
 (Bureau file 65-59264)

Referral/Consult

ReBulet May 1, 1951.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/22/94 BY SP2 BTI/SC

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Contact was had with [redacted] of the Robinson Studios, which establishment has the photographic contract for this office. [redacted] although not advised of the purpose of the contact, informed that Consumers' Research listed the Kodak Flash Banton-828 as one of the most serviceable and efficient cameras in the low price range. Likewise he said it was small, compact and easy to operate.

b6
 b7C

[redacted] also stated that the Kodak Tourist-620, equipped with a F-45 lens which takes $2\frac{1}{4}$ by $3\frac{1}{4}$ exposures, was an excellent conventional type camera for all around use. It has flash attachments. This camera retails in Anchorage for \$71.00.

[redacted] knew nothing of the Stecky II.

65-298
 JHW:vf

If a conventional type camera is to be used in this program, it is believed that a 35 mm. camera would be preferred. A Leica, Contax or less expensive Kodak 35 mm. camera would be used in most any assignment. Telephoto equipment can be used with Leica or Contax but not Kodak 35. Kodak 35 has built in flash.

RECORDED - 93

1-109

MAY 11 Referral/Consult

15

142
 62 MAY

72

5-15-51 7-1940

AN 65-298

It is noted that the use of miniature cameras is so limited in the Territory of Alaska that very little is known concerning them by the experts here.

The extent of the use of the camera by stay-behind agents, of course, is not known at this time but it is felt that the same will be limited. Likewise, the use of some type of flash equipment or infra-red would be quite limited in my opinion.

From the above, it is believed that a small, simple but efficient camera similar to the described Stecky II is sufficient for the needs of any stay-behind agent who could utilize a camera.


SAC, Anchorage

May 1, 1951

Director, FBI

RECOMMENDATION FOR INSTALLATION OF CONVENTIONAL
TYPE CAMERA IN STAY-BEHIND AGENTS
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Referral/Consult



You are instructed to confer with [redacted]

[redacted] thereafter,
you should submit your recommendations to the Bureau as to the
conventional type camera which would be most practical for the
use of stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

A reply to this communication is desired by May 9, 1951.

65-59264

WTB:mod

NOTE: [redacted]



Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 78

EX-576

110
MAY 2 3 50 PM '51
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

MAY 3 1951

Handwritten notes in a column on the left margin.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: May 7, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 BTJ/S

ON 6/22/94

Rebulet April 6, 1951, and Anchorage letter April 11, 1951, specifically paragraph 4 of page 1 which makes reference to caching.

There is transmitted herewith a dossier on caching of food, radio equipment, gasoline and survival gear for possible use in the establishment of caches which will be necessary in connection with this program.

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

JHW:MMA

65-298

Enclosure

RECORDED - 135

HANDLED BY
STOP WORK

EX-24

MAY 11 1951
15

5-BOB

JUN 1 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C. E. HENNRICH *ch*

DATE: March 21, 1951

FROM : W. T. Baker

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Referral/Consult

C *stage*

[Redacted Box]

[Redacted Box]

B. H. B.

ACTION

g f Ward

It is suggested that this memorandum be routed to Supervisor E. M. Gregg for possible assistance in connection with the lecture outlines he is preparing for the training program involved in the captioned matter.

Attachments

WTB:ow

65-59264

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/22/94 BY SP128TS/SC

342251

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

RECORDED - 26

INDEXED - 26

EX-72

165-51264 *W. T. Baker*
MAY 11 1951

5-WB

113

(MAY 29, 1951) (C)

RADIOGRAM


CIPHER PAD CO.

URGENT

SAC, ANCHORAGE (u)

Referral/Consult (u)

STAGE. REURLET (MAY ELEVEN) (C) (u) LA T. TRAINING AGENTS INSTANT PROGRAM
SCHEDULED BEGIN (JUNE ELEVEN) (C) (u) NEXT FOR TWO AGENTS PER WEEK ONE
BEGINNING (JUNE ELEVEN) (C) (u) AND OTHER (JUNE TWELVE) (C) (u) [redacted]



ARRANGEMENTS SO YOU OR ASAC [redacted] CAN INTERVIEW EVERY

TRAINEE PRIOR LATTER DEPARTURE. STREET SECURITY FEATURES AND BRIEF

65-59264-113

WFB:JEF

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy



Referral/Consult

SP2-BTS/64
G-14-2000

6/22/94
SP2-BTS/80
3/22/51

RECORDED

INDEXED

Antonia Bureau Recd. 1/30/51 1:12 AM.

291658
JFC
2100-0246

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO

THOROUGHLY. INSURE THAT TRAINEE UTILIZES APPROPRIATE COVER STORY TO EXPLAIN ABSENCE FROM ALASKA SO TRUE PURPOSE OF TRIP TO WASHINGTON DC WILL NOT BE DIVULGED. WHEN TRAINEE INSTRUCTED WHEN SCHEDULED FOR TRAINING, SECURE NAME OF BENEFICIARY DESIGNATED BY HIM SO ACCIDENT INSURANCE POLICY CAN BE SECURED AT SOG AMPLE TIME PRIOR TO TRAVEL. TRAINEE SHOULD NOT DEPART ALASKA UNTIL INSURANCE POLICY OBTAINED AND TRAVEL AUTHORIZED BY BUREAU. DETERMINE IF FOLLOWING CAN ARRANGE BE AT SOG BEGIN TRAINING EIGHT AM AS INDICATED [REDACTED]

(JUNE ELEVEN, [REDACTED] (u) (JUNE TWELVE, FRANK BERTON MOORE INCLUDING JUMP TRAINING (JUNE EIGHTEEN, [REDACTED] (u) (JUNE NINETEEN, DR. HOWARD ROMIG (JUNE TWENTY FIVE, [REDACTED] INCLUDING JUMP TRAINING (JUNE TWENTY SIX, DR. FOSTER R. SIMS (JULY TWO, [REDACTED] (u)

[REDACTED] XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (JULY THREE, [REDACTED] (u)

[REDACTED] MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN EFFECTING ARRANGEMENTS. SURAD ON INDIVIDUAL STAGE AGENT INCLUDING IDENTITY BENEFICIARY AS SCHEDULED TRAINING DATE CONFIRMED.

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: May 11, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (BuFile 65-59264)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 BTJ/SJC

Reference Bureau letters April 6 and May 4, 1951 and Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated May 8, 1951, pertaining to training.

Bureau letter of April 6, 1951, Page 5, indicates that possibly the training of Stay Behind Agents for the captioned program would begin on or about April 25, 1951. At Bureau direction this office is soliciting all potential Stay Behind Agents to determine (1) whether they will go to Washington for two weeks training (2) whether they will go for three additional weeks parachute jump training (3) the date on which they will be able to proceed to Washington (4) a period of three months during which they can leave for two weeks at the FBI's option for the training (5) whether they are amenable to the remuneration of \$150 per week plus \$4.00 a day expenses for training in Washington, D. C., or \$175 a week and \$4.00 a day expenses for the parachute training, and other questions pertaining to their attendance.

The assignments to contact all potential Stay Behind Agents have been made and Agents in this office are presently seeking these persons out.

① It is requested that the Bureau advise the date that the training will begin and the date on which the first potential Stay Behind Agents should report in order that this office can be guided in its contacts.

② It is also requested that the Bureau advise the number of Agents which it desires per week so that a tentative schedule may be set up here as a basis on which to work.

Referral/Consult

65-298
 JHT:HCW

*Radio gram
 to Anch.
 5-29-51
 ms.*

RECORDED - 134

EX-65

MAY 14 1951

15

5-WB

*113
 B. H. H. 11/3*

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

With particular reference to Bureau letter of April 6, 1951,
wherein it is stated on Page 3 that [REDACTED] 226

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

With reference to travel, it is suggested that the potential Stay Behind Agents be directed to contact this office upon his arrival in Anchorage where he will be briefed. It is further suggested that he be met at Seattle by one of our Agents there and aided in effecting transportation to Washington, D. C. This will insure that he makes connections and does not stop-over in Seattle for any protracted period of time.

It is also suggested that upon his departure from Seattle, the Seattle Office advise the Bureau in order that he can be met in Washington and escorted to the training base.

Referral/Consult

If the Bureau concurs with these suggestions, it is requested that the Seattle Office be advised of the plans in order that they will be able to carry out their assignments upon advice from the Anchorage Office that a certain potential Stay Behind Agent will arrive there on a certain date.

In making contacts with potential Stay Behind Agents with reference to the parachute training, they have brought up the question whether such training entails one or more parachute jumps. Certain of them who were in the Army or acquainted with the Air Force training feel that some parachute jumping courses are merely for the safety of fliers and while it teaches them the rudiments of jumping, no jumps are made. It is requested that the Bureau advise this office in this regard. It is also requested that the Bureau advise this office of the physical requirements which will be necessary for the potential Stay Behind Agents to take parachute training. Certain of them have indicated

a willingness but it is obvious that from their age and physical condition they should not be allowed to do so.

The Bureau will be kept advised of all developments in this matter.

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Hesse _____
Gandy _____

DECODED COPY

(u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(5-3-51)

NR 032014

6:51 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 73 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. 10 ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AUTHORIZED AND CASES ON THESE PERSONS ASSIGNED FOR HANDLING. MATERIAL RE REPORTS BEING COMPILED AND WILL BE SUBMITTED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

RECEIVED:

(5-3-51)

6:52 PM

MAP

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-11-01 BY 60322~~

~~6/25/94
SP-8 BTJ/SC
342251~~

RECORDED - 134

EX-65

SP3-BTS/JM

6-14-2000

00-1164

MAY 5 1951

5-43

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

(50 MAY 18 1951) (u)